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Chapter 1
Introduction
The steady advancement of computer technology over the past decades is accompanied by
a similar growth of the complexity of computerised systems. Decreasing costs for equiv-
alent hardware performance are the economical basis for the realisation of new applica-
tions. As a consequence, an increasing penetration of computerised systems in industrial
applications as well as in everyday life can be observed. There is a trend from a world
where computers are recognised and used as distinct devices towards computerised ma-
chines, which are not used or seen as computers by humans. This trend is reflected by
emerging terms like ubiquitous computing [92], pervasive computing [34, 11] or ambient
intelligence [61]. Despite the slightly different focus of the these terms, such systems are
generally referred to as embedded systems throughout this work. As characterised by Mar-
wedel [60], embedded systems are information processing systems that are embedded into
a larger product. This again emphasises potential invisibility of the involved information
processing technology, leading to situations, where users rely on information processing
without being aware of it.
While many embedded systems are designed to help humans in carrying out certain
tasks or simply for entertainment purposes, there is an increasing number of critical
applications performed by embedded systems. An application is considered to be critical,
if its malfunction could either endanger humans or cause considerable damage or cost.
For example, the anti-lock breaking system found in most automobiles today, can be
considered critical. If it fails for some reason such that breaking power is totally lost, an
accident with personal injury or other damage may follow. Therefore, anti-lock breaking
systems must be designed to avoid such failures as best as possible. In general, there has
always been great interest in designing systems, such that the probability of malfunctions
is minimised. Systems, which are especially designed to avoid malfunctions or failures,
are often called robust systems, or fault tolerant systems. Their design principles have
been investigated extensively by many researchers. Often, the starting point is a system
model, which is capable of describing the system along with its potential internal defects
and their consequences. For example, in the analysis of distributed algorithms, a common
system model is that of a fully interconnected network of N computing nodes, in which
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a broadcast can be performed consistently. Using such a model, it is possible to analyse
the properties of special architecture patterns or algorithms with respect to their fault
tolerance. It may be determined, how many of the N nodes may fail without impact on
the result of some distributed algorithm. For historical reasons, there exists a variety of
system models used for fault tolerance analysis, depending on the application and the
goal of the analysis. At present, there is no unique formal notion of a fault model for
embedded systems, which can be generically applied.
This thesis was carried out in cooperation with the Chemnitz University of Technol-
ogy and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) Military Aircraft,
Munich. One of the goals in the development of modern avionics systems is the use of
dynamic reconfiguration to achieve fault tolerance, which is a possible choice for Inte-
grated Modular Avionics (IMA) systems. In order to design and analyse dynamically
reconfigurable system architectures, a precise fault model was identified as a necessary
prerequisite. This thesis contributes a formal framework for fault modelling, as well as a
general way of behavioural analysis under precisely defined fault assumptions. Fault toler-
ance analysis is a special application within this framework. It is not the goal of this work
to provide design principles or algorithms for specific problems to create fault tolerant
systems. The approach proposed here enables the analysis of fault tolerance properties of
a given system, for example to verify the design principles used to create it.
1.1 Faults, Errors, Failures
The following list shows some synonyms and circumscriptions for the terms fault, error
and failure found at the Merriam-Webster online dictionary.
• Fault: [defect, deficiency, omission] a physical imperfection or impairment, respon-
sibility of wrongdoing or failure
• Error: [mistake, wrongdoing, fault, inaccuracy] unintentional departure from truth
or accuracy, a deficiency or imperfection in structure or function
• Failure: [collapse, breakdown, non-performance, non-success] the non-performance
of expected action, lack of success
As can be seen, there is a great portion of inaccuracy and overlap in the intuitive
perception of these terms. One of the goals of this thesis is to provide a more precise
account. To get a better understanding of the view on a system and the meaning of the
above terms in this work, an example from outside the field of computer systems follows
next. This example is taken from [38] and previously appeared in [82], where the authors
compare engineering practises in bridge design with practises in software design. Consider
a highway bridge over a river.
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[. . .] When designing the bridge the designer must consider a myriad of de-
tails regarding requirements, and the environment in which the bridge would
operate. Suppose a 20 ton truck drives onto the bridge and the bridge col-
lapses. From the truck’s point of view, the bridge has failed. But what is the
fault that led to the failure? There are lots of possible answers to this:
1. The designer of the bridge did not allow for appropriate bridge loading.
This could be:
(a) A specification fault if the highway department did not anticipate
that 20 ton trucks would need to use the bridge, or
(b) A design fault if the specification called for it being able to carry 20
ton trucks.
(c) An implementation fault if the fabricator didn’t correctly follow the
design.
2. The truck driver ignored a ”Load Limit” sign. This would be a user fault.
3. A worker for the highway department posted an erroneous ”Load Limit”
sign. This would be an operator fault.
4. The people preparing the documentation for the bridge mistakenly indi-
cated that the bridge would support 20 tons, when in fact it was only
designed to support 10 tons. The highway department erected a 20 ton
”Load Limit” sign. This would be a documentation fault, followed by an
operator fault.
5. Previously a 30 ton truck crossed the bridge and sufficiently weakened
the structure so that the subsequent 20 ton truck caused the bridge to
fail. This, again, would be a user fault (the prior user).
6. Inadequate maintenance caused the bridge to develop structural flaws
which led to it being unable to support a 20 ton truck. This would be
another operator fault.
7. A barge on the river hit the bridge and knocked out a support. Or a 100
year flood came along and washed the bridge out, or a meteor crashed
through the bridge. These would be environmental faults.
As an example of a fault which does not lead to a failure, consider the same
bridge with a crack in its concrete roadbed. There is no failure involved if the
bridge continues to carry the loads requested of it in spite of this fault. It may
be the result of normal wear and tear on the roadbed. However, a thorough
inspection of the bridge might discover that the crack in the roadbed was
a symptom of a faulty strut, only observable by x-raying the strut. From
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the point of view of the bridge inspector, the strut would have failed. This
component failure is an internal fault.
Scenarios like this can be generated ad infinitum. Note that a fault does
not lead to a failure unless the result is observable by the user, and leads to the
bridge becoming unable to deliver its specified service. This means that one
person’s fault is another person’s failure. For instance, in example 4 above,
from the point of view of the highway department the erroneous documentation
was a fault that led to an operator failure. From the point of view of the user
of the bridge the erroneous documentation was a documentation fault that led
to an operator fault which led to a bridge failure. [. . .]
All of the scenarios mentioned in the example have analogues in computer systems.
While the fine-grained distinction into different classes of faults and failures is very helpful
to determine who is responsible in the case of a malfunction, it is not of great importance
in this work. The primary focus revolves around the notion that a system is made up
of components which can fail in different ways, and that a system can be a component
itself, when it is a sub-system of a larger system. The example contains three major
assertions, which are fundamental to the framework presented here. First of all, faults
lead to failures. In other words, faults are the causes of failures, which closely corresponds
to the description at the beginning of this section. Secondly, faults do not necessarily lead
to failures. They only do so, if the result is observable by the user. It shall be seen that
this notion has a direct correspondence in the proposed framework. Since the framework
does not have an explicit notion of ”user”, observability of a fault (or its consequences)
is defined between components. The third assertion of the example is that a component
failure is an internal fault to the system containing the component. This fault in turn
may be the cause of a failure of the system. Figure 1.1 shows a chain of faults, errors
ErrorErrorFault
component/system boundary
component boundary
Failure FailureFault
internal fault
Figure 1.1: The fault-error-failure chain.
and failures, which results in a hierarchical system conception [12]. The chain originates
at some fault, the initial cause of a subsequent failure. As can be seen, a component
failure is the same as an internal fault, depending on the point of view. The component,
seen as a whole, exposes a failure to its surroundings, while the same failure is a fault for
the containing component. The failures at the system boundary, which are observable by
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the environment, could be termed external faults as a symmetric counterpart to internal
faults. Note that the term error is not especially mentioned in the bridge example, but is
often used in the field of fault tolerance. Usually, error refers to an inconsistent state or a
deviation from expected behaviour, which did not yet lead to a failure. In this sense, an
initial error can be considered as a fault, whereas a subsequent error is like a subsequent
fault, caused by the previous fault. Since there is only little distinction between the terms
fault and error, the latter does not play a specific role here.
1.2 Organisation of this Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an introduc-
tion to the existing scientific foundations, on which the ideas presented later are based.
These include established conceptions of system theory, playing an important role for the
development of the system model, as well as the theory communicating and concurrent
processes, which forms the mathematical basis for descriptions of behaviour within this
system model. Chapter 3 surveys research activities related to this thesis. It covers work
in the field of formalisms for embedded systems and different approaches to fault mod-
elling found in literature. Chapter 4 introduces the system model that constitutes the
basis for the fault model, the main contribution of this thesis. In chapter 5, the actual
fault model is developed, along with a formal account of fault tolerance within the context
of the proposed fault model. The extended example presented in chapter 6 illustrates the
application of the fault model to the principle of modular redundancy. It is shown how the
possibility of faults is integrated into the system description and how its fault tolerance
properties are derived. Finally, chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the presented
material and an outlook on possible future work. Figure 1.2 outlines the dependencies
between the individual chapters.
2. Foundations 4. System Model B An Intermediate Representation
3. Related Work 5. Fault Modelling A Process Contexts
7. Conclusions
1. Introduction
6. Example
Figure 1.2: Chapter dependencies.
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Chapter 2
Foundations
In this chapter, the existing foundations underlying the models developed later are briefly
introduced. The first part explains basic principles of system theory, which are reflected
in the system model presented in chapter 4. The second part introduces the model of
computation for the description of behaviour in both system model as well as the fault
model in chapter 5. Moreover, the second part of the foundations also covers the notions
of behavioural equivalence, on which the definition of fault tolerance is based within the
fault model..
2.1 System Theory
2.1.1 Basic System Concepts
System Theory was first proposed in the 1940’s by the biologist Ludwig von Berta-
lanffy [91], who noted that all systems studied by physicists are closed. As a biologist,
he knew the importance of the fact, that organisms are open systems, which continuously
exchange matter and energy with their environment. The peculiarity of open systems
is that they interact with their environment, which is separated from the system by the
system boundary. The systems considered in this work are also open systems. As system
in general is a very wide term, it shall be narrowed slightly. For the purposes of this
work, the term system shall refer to information processing system. That is, the quantity
exchanged with the environment through the interface is information. The information
entering the system is usually called input , whereas the information leaving the system for
the environment is called output . Thereby, the output can be, in general, quite different
from the input. The system is an active processor, transforming the information passing
through it. A very comprehensive presentation of system concepts and the transforma-
tional aspects of systems can be found in the introduction to cybernetics of Ashby [6].
Figure 2.1 illustrates the basic system concepts as explained so far.
The activity performed by a system in transforming input into output is called be-
haviour . In particular, the behaviour of a system is the relation it imposes between its
input time histories and output time histories. This is an empirical view of behaviour, as
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input outputSystem
boundary
Environment
Figure 2.1: Basic system concepts.
it is based on measurement or observation. For this reason, the behaviour a system ex-
poses to its environment is often called observable behaviour . System theory distinguishes
between the system structure (the inner constitution) and the behaviour (its outer man-
ifestation). In general, the internal structure of a system includes some notion of state
and state transition mechanism. Knowing the internal structure of a system allows for
the deduction of its behaviour [95].
A closer look at the environment reveals, that it too consists of systems interacting with
their environments. When considering a collection of such interacting systems together,
the collection can be seen as a system again. With respect to the whole, the parts are seen
as sub-systems , often called component systems, or simply components . With respect to
the components, the whole is seen as super-system. Looking at a system as a whole is
often called a black-box view, as the internals of the system are not considered, either
because they are simply unknown, or because they are ignored in favour of simplicity.
Figure 2.1 essentially shows a black-box view of a system. Conversely, it is a white-box
view if a system is seen by its components as in figure 2.2.
input output
Figure 2.2: Hierarchical system seen as a white-box.
2.1.2 Hierarchical System Descriptions
The black-box and white-box views of systems correspond to two fundamental complemen-
tary concepts of system theory: decomposition and composition. Systems are structured
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hierarchically at different levels of abstraction. Decomposition describes, how a system
may be broken down into components. Thereby, components may be further decomposed.
Conversely, composition describes how components may be coupled together to form a
larger system. Of course, the larger system can be viewed as component and may be part
of a yet larger system.
There is an important feature related to decomposition and composition, called closed
under composition, which is inherent to hierarchical system descriptions. Suppose there
is some basic notational system A, used to describe the inner structure of components.
For example, this could be a set of differential equations, the description of a finite state
machine (FSM) or another model of computation (MoC). Furthermore, suppose there is
another notational system B, allowing to describe the inner structure of a component by
assembling other components. Together, A and B form the overall notational facilities
to describe a system. Then, this notation is said to be closed under composition, iff any
composition of components given in terms of B, can be expressed in terms of the basic
notation A. That is, composition leads to a system, called resultant , with well defined
structure, and thus, with well defined behaviour [95].
A common way to describe composed systems consists of the notion of component
instancing and interconnecting their interfaces. Usually the interfaces are structured into
ports, which can be connected to the ports of other component instances. This general
pattern has also been used in the system model presented in chapter 4.
2.1.3 System Specification Formalisms
A formalism for composition of components does not lend itself for the definition of be-
haviour, as the components being assembled also need a description of their inner struc-
ture. This can be a composition again, but at some point the resulting hierarchy must be
terminated by using other means to define the behaviour. This section outlines some of
the existing means to do so.
Traditionally, systems were modelled by systems of differential equations having con-
tinuous states and continuous time. This class of system descriptions, usually called DESS
(Differential Equation System Specifications), is especially suited to model physical phe-
nomena that are continuous in their nature. Choosing a a discrete time base results
in DTSS (Discrete Time System Specifications), which is based on difference equations.
These two classes have their mathematical roots long before the advent of computers.
However, there is a third class called DEVS (Discrete Event System Specification), which
has both discrete time and discrete states [95]. This class was not initially considered to
be related to the two traditional paradigms, and many of its members were developed
independently, without recognising them as members of a common class of formalisms.
While the classification according to the classes DESS, DTSS and DEVS is based on the
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properties of their state and time domains, there are other classifications, especially for
the variety of formalisms belonging to DEVS, which includes prominent members like
VHDL [45] , Verilog and Simulink . Further models of computation include [60]:
• System Property Intervals (SPI) [96]: A system is modelled as a set of concurrent
processes, which communicate via first-in first-out (FIFO) channels or registers.
• Communicating Finite State Machines (CFSMs): Behaviour is specified by multiple
finite state machines (FSMs), which interact with each other. For example, Stat-
eCharts [37] and the Specification and Description Language (SDL) [47] are based
on this model of computation.
• Asynchronous Message Passing: Processes communicate via channels that have the
capability to buffer messages. Sender and Receiver do not need to wait for the
other, such that they are temporally decoupled. Variations of this MoC include
Kahn Process Networks (KPN) [51] and data flow models such as the synchronous
data flow model (SDF) [54].
• Synchronous Message Passing: Processes communicate in atomic and instantaneous
actions called rendez-vous. Thus, communication partners are always at the same
time at common communication points. This MoC is the basis of many process
algebras and a prominent language following this model of computation is ADA [12].
Often, different models of computation have equivalent expressive power regarding
computability. Thus, it is often the case, that one model of computation can be expressed
using another. For example, the synchronous specification language LUSTRE [33], which
is founded on a combination of the SDF and DTSS models of computation, was shown
to be representable in the pi-calculus process algebra by Windisch [93]. While the choice
for a specific model of computation depends on a variety of factors, DEVS seems to be a
promising computational basis for analysis and design of systems in general. This conclu-
sion rests on the universality and uniqueness claims of DEVS [95]. In the system model
presented here, a discrete event type model of computation and synchronous message
passing underlie behavioural descriptions. The corresponding theory is introduced in the
next section.
2.2 Process Calculi
2.2.1 History
In 1936, Alan Turing proposed a powerful model of computation, called the Turing ma-
chine . It is a very powerful model, and problems that can not be solved by a Turing
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machine are considered to be beyond the theoretical limits of computation, i.e. these
problems are algorithmically unsolvable [81]. In the same year, Alonzo Church devised a
notational system, called the λ-calculus . It was shown, that λ-calculus and Turing ma-
chines are equivalent definitions of algorithm; a result also known as the Church-Turing
thesis. Thus, the λ-calculus provides a mathematical foundation for the meaning of com-
putation. In λ-calculus, the process of computation proceeds in a sequential manner. It is
not possible (and was not in tented) to model the possibility that steps in a computation
can happen concurrently, and that processes can communicate to perform a computation.
Caused by the advent of computer networks, models of computation with these capabili-
ties became interesting. With process algebras, the mathematical toolbox offers a suitable
and precise foundation for these models of computation. In the past, several variations of
process calculi have emerged in parallel. While there are some differences in notation, the
choice of available primitives and the way of semantic definition, they share many funda-
mental concepts and properties. A prominent member is the theory of Communicating
Sequential Processes (CSP) of Hoare [39, 40], which formed the mathematical foundation
of the parallel programming language OCCAM [84] . A further approach to reasoning
about concurrent systems is ACP (Algebra of Communicating Processes) of Bergstra and
Klop [10, 9]. ACP especially focuses on the algebraic aspects and tries to provide an ab-
stract and generalised axiomatic system for processes [59]. The process algebra described
next was chosen as the basis for behavioural descriptions in this work.
2.2.2 Basic pi-calculus
In the late 1970’s, Robin Milner created the Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS),
an important contribution to concurrency theory [63, 64]. Within the following decade,
the pi-calculus emerged from CCS driven by the work of Robin Milner, Joachim Parrow
and David Walker [66], as well as the Extended Calculus of Communicating Systems
(ECCS) by Mogens Nielsen and Uffe Engberg [69]. Other extensions or modifications
have been proposed for the pi-calculus in the subsequent years. Some of them present
sub-calculi, such as the asynchronous pi-calculus, or augment the calculus with a type
system or the notion of time. This section reviews the basic concepts of the pi-calculus in
its polyadic form, without typing and time. The latter two extensions are the subject of
separate sections below.
The language of pi-calculus is defined in 2.2.1. The terms of this language, so called
process expressions or simply processes, describe both the structure and the behaviour
of mobile systems. The term mobile highlights the fact, that these systems can change
their communication and process structure dynamically. Processes use names to interact
and have the capability to exchange names, i.e. to send and receive them in interactions.
Names used for interaction are also called (communication) links . The capabilities offered
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by a process are expressed by action prefixes, which are denoted by α in the syntax. They
are a) receiving a name y via the name x written x (y), b) sending a name y via the name
x written x 〈y〉 and performing a silent action τ , given by (2.3) in that order. A prefixed
process P act consists of its action prefix and a continuation process , according to which a
process behaves after performing its action prefix. The names in prefixes are drawn from a
presupposed infinite set of distinct names N . Sometimes, the set Act = N∪N∪τ is called
the set of action labels, where the set N is called the set of co-names . Silent actions are
internal interactions, also called reactions , and are not observable by the environment.
There are two ways of composing processes. The summation captures the possibility
of alternative behaviour, sometimes also called choice. In a choice, an action prefix is
selected and the process evolves into the corresponding continuation process. If more
than one of the prefixes is offered by another process, the choice is non-deterministic.
Processes can evolve concurrently, as captured by the parallel composition . In such
context, prefixes consisting of name and co-name may synchronise and result in a reaction.
A way of expressing infinite behaviour is replication . It can be viewed as infinite parallel
composition of the same process. The notion of scope is introduced by restriction, which
binds names to the continuation process. In other words, restriction introduces a fresh
name which is valid and accessible only within the continuation process. The environment
cannot interact with the process through any bound name. In this way, internal behaviour
may be hidden from the environment, providing a means for abstraction. Finally, there
is the process constant 0, which can not further evolve and is therefore called inaction.
Definition 2.2.1 (Basic pi-calculus, syntax) The following productions define the syn-
tax of basic pi-calculus process expressions.
pi-Process: P ::= PΣ
∣∣∣ P | ∣∣∣ P ν ∣∣∣ P ! ∣∣∣ P 0(2.1)
Prefixed Process: P act ::= α.P(2.2)
Action prefix: α ::= λ
∣∣∣ τ(2.3)
λ ::= x (y)
∣∣∣ x 〈y〉(2.4)
Name: x, y ::= (some element of N )(2.5)
Summation: PΣ ::= P act
(
+ PΣ
)
∗(2.6)
Parallel Composition: P | ::= P
(
| P
)
∗(2.7)
Replication: P ! ::=!P(2.8)
Restriction: P ν ::= new x P(2.9)
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Inaction: P 0 ::= 0(2.10)
Throughout this work,
∣∣∣ and ()∗ denote syntactical choice and an arbitrary number of
occurrences, respectively. Furthermore, let P denote the set of all sentences, called process
expressions, generated by the above syntax.
In the course of interactions the processes evolve, thereby performing internal be-
haviour as well as offering points of interaction with the environment. The way in which
interaction takes place in any possible situation is formalised by a set of inference rules.
These rules give rise to the transition relation between process terms.
Definition 2.2.2 (Transition Relation) The transition relation {〈P, α,Q〉|P,Q ∈ P ;
α ∈ Act} is defined by transition rules.
Out: x 〈y〉.P x 〈y〉−−→ P Inp: x (z) .P x(y)−−→ {y/z}P Tau: τ.P −→ P
Sum:
P
α−→ P ′
P +Q
α−→ P ′
Par:
P
α−→ P ′
P | Q α−→ P ′ | Q bn(α) ∩ fn(Q) = ∅
Comm:
P
x 〈y〉−−→ P ′ Q x(y)−−→ Q′
P | Q τ−→ P ′ | Q′
Close:
P
x (z)−−→ P ′ Q x(z)−−→ Q′
P | Q τ−→ new z (P ′ | Q′) z /∈ fn(Q)
Res:
P
α−→ P ′
new z P α−→ new z P ′ z /∈ n(α) Open:
P
x 〈z〉−−→ P ′
new z P
x (z)−−→ P ′
z 6= x
Rep-Act:
P
α−→ P ′
!P
α−→ P ′ | !P Rep-Comm:
P
x 〈y〉−−→ P ′ P x(y)−−→ P ′′
!P −→ (P ′ | P ′′) | !P
Rep-Close:
P
x (z)−−→ P ′ P x(z)−−→ P ′′
!P −→ (new z (P ′ | P ′′)) | !P z /∈ fn(P )
The application of transition rules unfolds the dynamic behaviour of a process expression.
As long as further transitions can be inferred, the process can proceed with its evolution.
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One can picture this evolution similar to a finite automaton, where the states are given
by the process expressions and the transitions are labelled by the action prefixes which
ultimately caused their inference. The corresponding mathematical structure is called
labelled transition system (LTS) and is given in definition 2.2.3.
Definition 2.2.3 (LTS) The labelled transition system (LTS) of a process P is a pair
〈Q, T 〉, where the set of states Q is the reflexive transitive closure of process expressions
derivable from P under the transition relation. The ternary relation T ⊂ Q×Act×Q is
called the transition relation. Any triple 〈Q,α,Q′〉 ∈ T is written Q α−→ Q′, where Q is
called the source and Q′ is called the target of the transition.
With the notion of transition relations and labelled transition systems it is possible
to define equivalence relations and congruences in order to compare the behaviour of
different processes. Milner introduces weak and strong bisimulation as well as structural
congruence as different flavours of behavioural equivalence with increasing discriminating
power in this order. Since there is a variety of more or less differing notions of behavioural
equivalence based on bisimulation , the following definitions make the meaning referred
to in this work precise.
Definition 2.2.4 (Strong simulation) Let 〈Q, T 〉 be an LTS, and let S be a binary
relation over Q. Then S is called a strong simulation over 〈Q, T 〉 if the following holds:
whenever PSQ,
if P
α−→ P ′, then there exists Q′ ∈ Q, such that Q α−→ Q′ and P ′SQ′.
It is said that Q strongly simulates P , if there is a strong simulation S, such that PSQ.
Definition 2.2.5 (Strong bisimulation, strong equivalence) A binary relation S
over Q is said to be a strong bisimulation over the LTS 〈Q, T 〉 if both S and its converse
S−1 are strong simulations. It is said that P and Q are strongly bisimilar or strongly
equivalent, written P ∼ Q, if there exists a strong bisimulation S such that PSQ.
A major goal of the equivalence theory is that systems with different internal behaviour
may also be regarded as equivalent, as long as they show the same external behaviour
. Thus, a less discriminating equivalence relation which ignores internal transitions is
sought. Therefore, the definition of weak simulation is very similar to strong simulation,
except that the arbitrary transitions
α−→ are replaced by observations →* λ−→ →* ,
where →* is an arbitrary number of reactions preceding or following the observable
transition
λ−→ .
Definition 2.2.6 (Weak simulation) Let 〈Q, T 〉 be an LTS, and let S be a binary re-
lation over Q. Then S is called a weak simulation over 〈Q, T 〉 if, whenever PSQ,
if P →* α−→ →* P ′, then there exists Q′ ∈ Q, such that Q →* α−→ →* Q′ and
P ′SQ′.
It is said that Q weakly simulates P , if there is a weak simulation S, such that PSQ.
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Definition 2.2.7 (Weak bisimulation) A binary relation S over Q is said to be a weak
bisimulation over the LTS 〈Q, T 〉 if both S and its converse S−1 are weak simulations. It
is said that P and Q are weakly bisimilar or weakly equivalent, written P ≈ Q, if there
exists a weak bisimulation S such that PSQ.
These relations partition the set of process expressions into equivalence classes, whose
members show the same behaviour regarding the corresponding equivalence relation.
Given a process expression serving as specification and another process expression serving
as implementation, one can prove that the implementation actually does what the spec-
ification demands by showing that one of the equivalence relations between the process
expressions holds. Several tools for analysing pi-calculus expressions exist. For example,
there is the Mobility Workbench (MWB) [88, 87] whose main feature is checking bisimu-
lation equivalences. It is also possible to specify requirements using temporal logic, and
determine if a process expression possesses the properties by applying model checking
techniques [85]. In [94], a model checker for mobile systems specified akin to pi-calculus,
called Mobility Model Checker (MMC) , is presented.
2.2.3 Typed pi-Calculus
According to Close and Comm, two concurrent processes synchronise whenever they
both have the capability to engage in an action prefix with the same name. In the
resulting transition, a value is exchanged along the link denoted by the name of the
common action prefix. This exchange manifests itself in the necessary application of
Inp, where a substitution causes the transmitted name to occur in the receiving process
expression. In basic pi-calculus, the exchanged values are just names again, such that the
receiving process can validly send or receive other names on a received name. There is no
restriction on the usage of names, because there is no notion which distinguishes names
(other than syntactical difference). In the typed calculus, this notion is provided by the
so called type environment . The type environment is a finite set of assignments of a type
to a name, written x : T , where x is a name and T denotes a type. A type environment
is sometimes called type assumption or typing , and may be viewed as a finite function
from named to types. Therefore, Γ(x) denotes the type assignment to the name x under
the type environment Γ.
Assertions of the form Γ ` E : T are called type judgements , where E may be a
process or a name. Process type judgements are of the form Γ ` P : , where  denotes
the behavioural type , and assert that the process P respects the type assumption in Γ.
In contrast, name type judgements Γ ` x : T assert that name x has type T under Γ.
Type judgements are valid, iff they can be proven by the axioms and rules of the type
system.
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The set of types available for assignment in a type environment is defined by a finite
set of basic types and type constructors , which from new types from other types. A
”minimal” type system for pi-calculus contains only one type constructor: the connection
type Tˆ . A name typed Tˆ is called a link and can carry values of type T . Since in pi-
calculus there are also links that carry no values, the minimal type system must provide
a corresponding basic type. Therefore, the set of basic types must at least contain ?, the
unit type1. Links which are typed ?ˆ can be used for synchronisation only, since no data is
exchanged. More formally, the transitions resulting from interactions on such links do not
cause substitutions of values of ? for names of type ? in the continuation of the receiving
process. In fact, action prefixes with a subject of type ?ˆ have no objects, and instead of
writing x () .P | x 〈〉.Q it is briefly written x.P | x.Q. As a consequence, non-link names
of unit type do never occur in process expressions, and thus one can take the domain of
? to be the empty set.
A typed calculus using this minimal type system (ˆ and ?) essentially provide the same
capabilities as the untyped pi-calculus. That is, synchronisation via links and transmitting
links over links. In a more sophisticated type system, the set of basic types contains further
types, for example Boolean ranging over {true, false} and natural numbers ranging over
N. However, the most powerful mechanism of a type system is the construction of new
types using type constructors. Besides the connection type, which is vital for pi-calculus,
a reasonable type system would include type constructors for tuples, records, unions,
variants and recursive types, for example.
As already pointed out, the connection type plays a special role. It is a so called
link type, and names of a link type, called link names or links, can be used as subjects
in action prefixes. Thus, a process can use links for sending and receiving. Moreover,
links may also serve as objects in action prefixes. In other words, they can serve as the
values being transmitted as well as a placeholder being the target when receiving a value.
In contrast to links, the usage of names typed by basic types is restricted. They can
not be used as subjects in action prefixes, i.e. a process can not transmit values via such
names. Basic types are considered as non-link types. Type constructors like tuple, record,
union and variant also yield non-link types. Consequently, names of these types obey the
restrictions of non-link names. Like links, also non-link names are considered to be value
names, such that they may be used as objects in action prefixes, which means that they
can be transmitted over links (of the appropriate type).
In addition to names, the typed calculus also provides the possibility to specify concrete
values in process expressions. These basic values are represented by unique literals, which
may be regarded as constant symbols for elements of basic types. Basic values are distinct
from both link and non-link names, because of the additional restriction that they can
not serve as objects in receive prefixes. Links, non-link names and basic values form
1The unit type is comparable to void of some programming languages.
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Names
= symbols of elements
Links
Typed Entities
= names, whose type
is a link type
= names, whose type
of basic types
Non−Link Names
Basic Values
is a non−link type
Figure 2.3: The hierarchy of typed entities.
subject object of send object of receive
links y y y
non-link names n y y
literals n y n
Table 2.1: Restriction of the use of typed entities in action prefixes.
a hierarchy of typed entities in a typed calculus, as depicted in figure 2.3. Table 2.1
summarises the valid usage of typed entities in action prefixes.
In the following, the syntax of typed processes is outlined, as well as some type rules
for proving type judgements. Moreover, there is a set of typed transition rules, which
define the behaviour of typed processes.
Definition 2.2.8 (Types, syntax) The syntax given below defines the notation of types
in the minimal type system.
Types: T ::= B
∣∣∣ TC ∣∣∣ (2.11)
Basic types: B ::= ?(2.12)
Type Constructors: TC ::= L(2.13)
Link Types: L ::= Tˆ(2.14)
The minimal type syntax can be extended by adding basic types and other type con-
structors. Often there is a category of non-link type constructors, providing record and
recursive types, for example. An extension of the type system usually requires to define
additional type rules as well as appropriate transition rules.
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Definition 2.2.9 (Typed pi-calculus, syntax) The syntax of typed pi-calculus equals
that of basic pi-calculus, plus the following exceptions and additions:
Restriction: P ν ::= new x : L P(2.15)
Wrong: Pwrong ::= wrong(2.16)
Action prefix: α ::= x (y)
∣∣∣ x 〈v〉 ∣∣∣ τ(2.17)
Send object: v ::= x
∣∣∣ literal(2.18)
The modified Restriction allows for the notation of type assignments x : L when
introducing links in a process, where L is a link type as in definition 2.2.8. There is
also one additional production rule called Wrong. It defines a special process constant
wrong, which indicates a type error situation. Whenever a process evolves to wrong,
a type error has occurred. Processes are called well-typed , iff they can not evolve to
wrong. Furthermore, the syntax of action prefixes is refined. The objects of send prefixes
may still be names as before, but now also literals of basic values are allowed. This
provides the points where concrete values may be introduced into process expressions.
It is syntactically impossible to use literals as subjects of prefixed and objects of receive
prefixes, such that terms like 5 〈x〉 or x (true) are invalid a priori.
Definition 2.2.10 (Type rules) A type judgement Γ ` E : T is valid, iff it can be
derived from E using the following rules.
T-Base : Γ ` basval : B basval ∈ B T-Name : Γ, x : T ` x : T
T-Par :
Γ ` P :  Γ ` Q : 
Γ ` P | Q :  T-Sum :
Γ ` P :  Γ ` Q : 
Γ ` P +Q : 
T-Inact : Γ ` 0 :  T-Rep : Γ ` P : 
Γ ` !P : 
T-Res :
Γ, x : L ` P : 
Γ ` new x : L P :  T is link type T-Tau :
Γ ` P : 
Γ ` τ.P : 
T-Inp :
Γ ` x : Tˆ Γ, y : T ` P : 
Γ ` x (y) .P : 
T-Out :
Γ ` x : Tˆ Γ ` y : T Γ ` P : 
Γ ` x 〈y〉.P : 
Given a process expression, name or basic value, valid type judgements can be derived via
the type rules of definition 2.2.10. Rule T-Base provides the fundamental typing for basic
values; T-Name states that the name x is of type T , if the type environment contains
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x : T . Rules T-Sum and T-Par state that the summation and parallel composition of two
processes respects the typing of Γ, whenever both processes in isolation respect Γ. The
inactive process 0 respects every type environment according to T-Inact. Replication
of a process, as well as prefixing a process P by τ yield processes that respect Γ, if P
respects Γ according to T-Rep and T-Tau respectively. Any process prefixed by an input
action respects Γ by T-Inp, whenever the subject is a link of some type T and the process
respects Γ extended by the assignment of T to the object of the input prefix. Similarly,
a process prefixed by an output action respects Γ, if Γ assigns compatible types to the
subject and objects of the prefix and the process alone respects Γ.
Definition 2.2.11 (Typed pi-calculus, semantics) The following transition rules de-
fine operational semantics of typed pi-calculus.
Out: x 〈y〉.P x 〈y〉−−→ P Inp: x (z) .P x(y)−−→ {y/z}P Tau: τ.P −→ P
Sum:
P
α−→ P ′
P +Q
α−→ P ′
Par:
P
α−→ P ′
P | Q α−→ P ′ | Q bn(α) ∩ fn(Q) = ∅
Comm:
P
x 〈y〉−−→ P ′ Q x(y)−−→ Q′
P | Q τ−→ P ′ | Q′
Close:
P
x (z:T )−−−−→ P ′ Q x(z)−−→ Q′
P | Q τ−→ new z : T (P ′ | Q′) z /∈ fn(Q)
Res:
P
α−→ P ′
new z : T P α−→ new z : T P ′ z /∈ n(α) Open:
P
x 〈z〉−−→ P ′
new z : T P
x (z:T )−−−−→ P ′
z 6= x
Rep-Act:
P
α−→ P ′
!P
α−→ P ′ | !P Rep-Comm:
P
x 〈y〉−−→ P ′ P x(y)−−→ P ′′
!P −→ (P ′ | P ′′) | !P
Rep-Close:
P
x (z:T )−−−−→ P ′ P x(z)−−→ P ′′
!P −→ (new z : T (P ′ | P ′′)) | !P z /∈ fn(P )
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Out-Err:
Γ(v) is a non-link type
v 〈y〉.P τ−→ wrong Inp-Err:
Γ(v) is a non-link type
v (y) .P
τ−→ wrong
These rules consider the syntax of the minimal type system only. Extending the type
system and corresponding syntax requires additional transition rules in order to define
semantics.
The rules in definition 2.2.11 are in analogy with the rules of the untyped basic pi-calculus.
Differences are found in Close, Open and Rep-Close, which are modified to carry type
information of extruded names. In [78], Sangiorgi provides transition rules of the typed
calculus slightly different, such that it is possible to accommodate bound and unbound
output in a single rule for commitment. This way the number of rules can be reduced
because Close and Rep-Close are not necessary anymore. However, this step is not
taken here in order to keep the analogy to untyped semantics more explicit and easier
to understand. Two rules which are not known in the untyped calculus are Out-Err
and Inp-Err. They give rise to run-time type errors, signalled by reaching wrong. In
the case of Out-Err and Inp-Err this is caused when trying to send or receive on a
non-link name.
Chapter 3
Related Work
After the foundations presented in the previous chapter, an overview of research activities
in the fields of models and formalisms for describing embedded systems, approaches to
formalise system level fault modelling and formal accounts of fault tolerance is given next.
3.1 Classification
The primary goal of the development of fault calculus was to establish a uniform and
formal method of representing the behaviour of systems in a way, such that potential run-
time faults can be assumed and that their consequences can be studied. The key benefit
of this approach is that the impact of faults can be assessed on the system model, before
a real implementation is available. The development of this model mainly intersects with
two fields of research.
The first field focuses on the development and use of formalisms to model embedded
systems. Such systems may consist of very different parts, like digital controllers, signal
processors, sensors, actuators, A/D and D/A converters, to name only a few. Because of
the variety of components and the substantial differences in their nature, there will prob-
ably never be a single formalism which can capture all properties equally well. In fact, no
single formalism will suffice to capture all properties of one single component comprehen-
sively. Therefore, environments like PARADISE [36], that successfully integrate different
paradigms, have been developed. However, from the prospective of a system level of ab-
straction, where the behaviour is of primary importance, it is possible to define formalisms
that can be uniformly used for very different types of components. In section 3.2 some
examples in this direction are explained.
The second field of research investigates approaches to analysing the impact of faults
on the expected system behaviour. While a formal description of behaviour (e.g. in
terms of a programming language) might be provably correct with respect to a given
specification, its real implementation may experience unforeseen defects, such that the
resulting behaviour deviates from what is expected. Even if proved to be correct, the
behaviour can violate the specification, as correctness tells nothing about the behaviour
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under faults. In order to analyse such situations, the formal description may be tested
with concrete invalid data, or the description itself is explicitly modified. The latter is
the particular area of interest related to this work, namely the representation of faults as
part of the system model. Section 3.3 surveys research activities in this area.
3.2 Embedded Systems Modelling and Description
Formalisms
3.2.1 Embedded System Modelling
There are two particular projects in the area of embedded system modelling that use
process algebraic foundations for their description languages. In the Software/Hardware
Engineering (SHE) methodology [29] of the University of Eindhoven, the basic specifi-
cation formalism POOSL (Parallel Object Oriented Specification Language) is based on
concurrent processes that communicate via channels [2]. The semantics of the POOSL
language are defined in a similar mathematical way like usual for process algebras. Due
to the formal semantics, model checking techniques can be used to perform formal verifi-
cation of correctness properties. Furthermore, the resulting models are executable, which
can be done with the tools SHEsim and Rotalumis. A unique feature of an extended
version of the Rotalumis tool is the synthesis of real-time control software from a POOSL
model.
Another language based on process algebra is µCRL (micro CRL) [31]. It is intended
to study description techniques for large distributed systems. Thereby, the focus is to
take into account the data in communication between processes. An extension to the
ACP process algebra in a similar way as presented in section 2.2.3. This language is
also supported by a set of tools to manipulate or reduce process algebraic specifications of
µCRL, as well as performing state space explorations. The tool-set also includes a theorem
prover. Finally, there is a time extension of µCRL, allowing for the modelling and analysis
of distributed real-time systems. Further information can be obtained directly from the
µCRL web-site [1].
3.2.2 Timed Description Formalisms
Different approaches to extend process algebras with a notion of time can be found in
literature. Usually this is done by introducing some additional syntax and defining its
meaning through a set of transition rules. The time extension presented in section 4.2.2
follows a similar approach. While seminal work in this area is due to Alur&Dill [4], the
most closely related publications to name are on Timed CSP (TCSP) [18] and Timed Prob-
abilistic CCS (TPCCS) [35]. The authors extend CSP and CCS, the origin of pi-calculus,
with time. Both approaches use a two-phase execution model. In this model, processes
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urgently execute all possible reactions. Thereafter, all components synchronously delay
for some time, before entering the next ”reaction” phase. In Probabilistic Real-Time CCS
(PRTCCS) [89], the focus is on performance analysis. The proposed extension allows
specification of random delays distributed according to an approximated random process.
Another time extension to pi-calculus is presented in [55]. In this paper, time is mod-
elled by specific time events which represent the progress of one time unit. Consequently,
the time domain is discrete. Timing information is captured by a timeout operator with
semantics defined operationally. In [18] the primitive for capturing time information is
the WAIT d operator whose semantics are given in denotational form, as this is typically
done in CSP. However, in [80] operational semantics are also given for TCSP. Other ap-
proaches to time extension for LOTOS [53] and CCS [24] use enabling time intervals to
express when actions of a process can engage with another process. This is in contrast to
the timing extension proposed here, where actions are enabled on a state-by-state basis
and cannot be deferred in the same state. Thus, states mark moments in time while the
transitions from one state to another may consume time.
3.3 Fault Modelling Approaches
3.3.1 Classification of Faults
An intuitive definition of failure is given by Randell [75]: ”When the behaviour of a
system deviates from that which is specified for it, this is called a failure.”. A similar
notion is considered by Christian [17]: ”A server failure occurs, when the server does not
behave in the manner specified.”. Furthermore, failures result from unexpected problems
internal to the system which eventually manifest themselves in the system’s external
behaviour. These problems are called errors and their causes are termed faults [12], as
already mentioned in the introduction. Further definitions and explaining examples can
be found in [86, 76, 15]. Faults can be classified according to the level of abstraction at
which they are considered. Such levels of abstractions are1:
• (manufacturing) process level
• layout level
• transistor level
• gate level
• register transfer level
• function level, system level
1Note, that this list is not meant to be complete. Depending on the purpose, other levels of abstraction
may be assumed.
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Different levels of abstraction have their own faults and fault models, depending which
entities are considered. For example, at the process level, point, cluster or random defects
are considered for whole wafers and are used to predict the process yield. At the transistor
and gate level, physical parameters and fabrication causes are usually considered by a fault
model. A typical fault considered at gate level is the stuck-at fault , which models the
fact that a wire stays at the same value, irrespective of the signal driving it. While this
already abstracts from physical causes like shorts or opens due to failed solder joints, it
is still a very low-level fault model, quickly becoming intractable with growing size of
the overall system. At register transfer level, bit-based fault models are still dominant.
However, they are used on larger blocks instead of single gates. As the level of abstraction
is raised, the faults models become more and more abstract as well. That means, there is
usually no tangible connection which relates the faults under consideration to its actual,
physical cause. Nevertheless, these fault models represent things which happen in reality,
like a communication partner that does not respond, or a lost message. The following list
is a collection of fault models found in system level fault modelling literature.
• Fail-stop [79]: Processes may stop execution, but other processes can certainly
decide whether another process has stopped.
• Crash [32]: Process stop, but in contrast to fail-stop, no evident about this is
available, except that the process does not respond to communication. Thus, the
crash of a process must be concluded from missing interaction.
• General Omission [72]: In this fault model, processes may skip an arbitrary
number of interactions. The crash model is a special case, where all interactions are
omitted.
• Byzantine [52]: Processes may behave arbitrarily, even maliciously.
These fault models are commonly used in a context, where systems are described by a set of
communicating and concurrent processes. Unfortunately, they are usually communicated
on an informal basis, which may cause varying meaning or understanding. For this reason,
there are several activities in the field of system level modelling which try to put the
corresponding fault models on a formal basis.
Usually, the term fault assumption is used to denote the specification, which faults are
assumed to occur potentially at run-time [20]. Nordahl [70] distinguishes between local
and global fault assumption. While the local fault assumption essentially adds (faulty)
behaviour to a system, the global fault assumption restricts it again. A typical global
fault assumption is, for example, that only on fault occurs at a time. Vo¨ltzer [90] calls
local fault assumptions the impact model of faults, as these describe the effect of a fault
on the behaviour. Sometimes, fault assumptions are also called failure semantics [17, 56]
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for this reason. The behaviour of a system with applied fault assumption is called the
fault-affected behaviour [57].
3.3.2 Fault Modelling at System Level
It was already mentioned, that the components of embedded systems can differ signifi-
cantly in their nature, such that no single formalism will suffice to describe all aspects
appropriately. The same argument is valid for modelling faults. Considering the multi-
tude of physical effects that contribute to the behaviour of a component implementation,
it can not be expected to find a uniform way to describe faults at this level. In system
level fault modelling, it is not the goal to obtain a model, which can capture the physical
origins of every unexpected behaviour. Rather than the precise defects, only their possi-
ble consequences are modelled as ”system level faults”. That is, many different physical
causes can lead to the same fault at system level. Only because of this abstraction it is
possible to define a sensible fault modelling framework. Of cause, every type of abstrac-
tion also bears the danger of loosing precision. However, in the case of fault modelling,
the abstraction does not affect completeness. Imagine some very subtle defect in the
hardware underlying some piece of application functionality at run-time. There are two
possibilities: either the defect influences the application behaviour, or it does not affect
it. In the latter case, it may be argued, that the system is not vulnerable to this type
of fault, and hence there is no need to model it at system level. On the other hand, if
the defect does affect the application behaviour, it can be expected that it is possible to
describe this deviation in terms of the behavioural description formalism. The precision
which is lost by the abstraction of faults at system level has consequences in the other
direction: a system level fault can usually not be attributed to a unique physical defect
which caused it.
An example of this type of fault modelling is the functional fault model of Camurati et
al. [13, 14]. In their approach, the system level description is based on a process algebra.
Faults are modelled by introducing special processes, which intercept the communication
of the normal system processes. By letting the special processes modify communication
events, faulty channels can be realised. According to the authors, it can be shown, that
in combination with a hierarchical description methodology, communication faults have
the same expressive power like a fault model, where the behaviour of the original system
processes is modified directly. The general approach is illustrated in figure 3.1.
Depending on the intercepting processes, different types of communication faults can
be modelled. The fault model features elementary faults, which can be automatically
generated and included in the system description based in the structure of the system.
Thereby, elementary faults play at system level the same role, as stuck-at faults play at the
gate-level. Furthermore, there are complex faults, modelling a particular malfunctioning
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Figure 3.1: Communicating processes and an intercepting process modelling a fault.
to be considered. Complex faults have to be specified and integrated manually into the
system model. In order to find out, whether faults influence the overall system behaviour,
a so-called testing equivalence relation is used. There is also a test pattern generation
algorithm, which produces test patterns that can detect the faults introduced into the
system model.
A particular example of fault modelling based on process algebra is presented by
Berger&Honda [8]. The authors use specifically tailored extensions to the pi-calculus to
represent, among other things, the notions of message loss, sites and site failures . Based
on these extensions, essential properties of the Two-Phase Commitment Protocol (2PCP)
can be analysed under various fault assumptions. In contrast to the approach of Camurati
above, not the modifications of communication between processes is used to model faults,
but an alternate behaviour of sites and their processes induced by special transition rules.
A basic assumption in the modelling proposed by Berger&Honda is that messages from
one site to another can get lost, while intra-site messages are never lost. Instead of
applying a transformation to achieve a message loss in the model, a special transition rule
called LOSS is introduced. Similarly, process failures are modelled by specific syntactic
and semantic extensions.
Finally, motivated by the belief that a formal foundation will enable a more precise
discussion among researchers, Jones [50] proposes to formalise the notions of faults, errors
and failures in a system context. This publication, which appeared around the time the
work on this thesis was started, initiates and tries to direct the formalisation effort in
the ”formal methods” community. The goal of the author is to fix a particular notion of
system, and formally define the terms fault, error and failure with respect to this notion.
The concrete system formalism used to develop his ideas is based on VDM [48, 49], but
the author emphasises that other formalisms like B [3] or Z [46] are equally suited. With
a process algebra, yet another formalism is used in this work. The notable difference,
that also concurrent systems can be described, shall be mentioned in this respect. On the
other side, the ”verification” aspects of B or Z are not as explicit in the process algebraic
foundation.
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3.3.3 Faults Modelled by Program Transformations
An approach to formal fault modelling used by Girault [30] and Vo¨ltzer [90] is based on
superposition of Petri-Nets. Thereby, the system or an algorithm is given by a Petri-Net
representation, and the fault impact model is represented by another Petri-Net. Then,
the union of both nets yields the fault affected version of the system or algorithm. In
contrast to this approach, the fault modelling presented in proposed here is based on
transformations.
Modelling faults and their consequences on the behaviour using a transformational
approach rests upon the observation, that systems change their state in two fundamentally
different ways. Normally, the system evolves as expected, according to some reference or
specification. The other source of state changes is due to fault occurrences [16]. Thus, a
fault can be modelled as an unwanted, but nevertheless possible state transition, which
can be seen as an additional action initiated by the environment [26]. In [27, pp. 74-77],
the author defines the fault model as a mapping from the set of programs T into T .
This idea is attributed to Christian [16], similar ideas are proposed by Echtle [19] and
were generalised by Liu and Joseph [58], Arora and Gouda [5] and Ga¨rtner [28]. In this
approach, a program is given as an abstract state machine. Transformations of the guards
and actions specifying the machine’s transition relation model both the occurrence and
the effects of faults. Assuming that prop(Σ) denotes the union of all execution traces
of Σ, the following relationship between a program Σ ∈ T and its faulty counterpart
Σ′ = F (Σ):
(3.1) prop(Σ) ⊆ prop(Σ′).
states that the fault model F is behavioural enlarging. This means that any trace of Σ
is also a valid trace of Σ′. This property is important, because the faulty version should
be able to behave exactly as the original, but have additional, unwanted and initially
unspecified behaviour caused by the occurrence of faults. This notion of faulty programs
can be extended to general descriptions of behaviour, as shall be seen later.
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Chapter 4
System Model
This chapter introduces the system model, upon which the fault model is based. It is
divided in two parts. The first part covers the structural aspects of the system model
by outlining the individual model objects, which are used to represent logical as well as
hierarchical structuring. The second part introduces the formalism underlying behavioural
descriptions in the model, called the basic representation. In particular, the extensions
that were developed for the pi-calculus presented in chapter 2 are explained in detail.
4.1 Hierarchical Structure
In order to describe a model, a set of suitable modelling elements is needed. Thereby,
the modelling elements represent important parts or aspects of the real world, usually
focusing on some specific domain of interest. Hence, the entity comprising modelling
elements is often called a domain model. The authors of [42] ”. . . use the term domain
model to describe all the domain object types and the relationships among their instances,
which collectively describe the domain space.” In this work, the domain space is called
distributed embedded systems, and the proposed domain model contains model objects such
as Components, Parts, Ports, Connections, Attributes, Datatypes, etc. Since instances of
the model objects themselves form the model of a system, the domain model may also be
called a meta model.
A distinctive feature of the domain model presented here is its capability to describe
layered platforms, as well as applications running on these platforms. This feature is es-
pecially useful for modern system architectures, which try to avoid the direct interfacing
of hardware and application software. Often it is the case, that standardised abstrac-
tion layers provide uniform application interfaces across different computer architectures,
sometimes even for different operating systems. Prominent examples are POSIX [44] and
CORBA [71]. A common approach applied to achieve this is to introduce middleware into
the system architecture. In the proposed domain model, middleware can be modelled as
topmost layer of a platform, which provides an interface to applications. Thus, an appli-
cation, of course with limitations, does not require a special hardware architecture, but
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assumes a certain layer to run on. Moreover, the domain model permits an application to
serve as layer itself, such that stacks of multiple layers may be modelled in a uniform way.
A further feature of the domain model is the uniform treatment of hardware and software
components. They are entirely characterised by their interface along with their observable
behaviour. Hence, there is no explicit hardware-to-software boundary in the model. The
boundary of concern is rather the boundary between application and platform. Of course,
this may coincide with the hardware-to-software boundary, but in the context of layered
architectures, is more appropriate to speak of an application-to-platform interface.
The remainder of this section explains in detail the important model objects of the do-
main model. The description follows the software implementation of the domain model,
which was realised using the Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF). The UML-like dia-
grams help to understand the domain model by giving a more intuitive picture than a
rigorous mathematical formulation would give. Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the parts
of the domain model. It is divided into several packages.
Figure 4.1: The domain model packages.
4.1.1 Logical Structuring of Models
When creating the model of a system, all model objects may be organised into a logical
hierarchy. As shown in figure 4.2, the IflowPackage model object provides support for
creating a package structure containing IflowPackageElements. These can be packages
again (i.e. sub-packages), but also Components and Types, for example. Each package has
a name, which must be unique in the current branch of the name space, and opens a sub-
branch in the name space. Thus, naming conflicts of model objects (which all have a name)
can be avoided. Model objects can be uniquely referred to by their full qualified name,
which is their own name prefixed by the name of the containing name space, delimited
by a dot. The root of the package hierarchy, and thus the name space, is provided by a
Project model object. While a Project serves as a container for IflowPackageElement
objects, it is not a IflowPackageElement itself. Thus, it cannot be contained within an
element container and is therefore the root element.
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Figure 4.2: The Package model object and related hierarchy.
4.1.2 Components
The central modelling element is the Component. It is used to describe systems or sub-
systems at an arbitrary level of abstraction. Thereby, no difference between the modelling
of hardware and the modelling of software is made. A component communicates with its
environment through its interface, which consists of Ports and Methods— so called inter-
action points. Each Component contains a so called View, which describes its behaviour.
Components have a type, designating them either as processing or as communication
components. This distinction allows for a clear separation between the modelling of data
transfer and data transformation. Like in SpecC [25], the separation of processing from
communication concerns is an essential concept. While Components are definitions of
the constituent parts of a system model, the model itself is formed by Instance model
objects, which are obtained by instancing Components. The instantiation of every Compo-
nent consists of creating instances for the component itself, as well as transitively creating
instances for every sub-component . Sub-components arise from the PVPartsView which
is explained shortly.
Figure 4.3: The Component model object.
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4.1.3 Attributes
Each Component owns a set of Attribute model objects. They may be used to capture
non-functional properties of components, which are either defined constantly or can be
evaluated dynamically. Each attribute has a name, type, range and value. An evaluation
function can be specified for dynamic evaluation. Upon component instantiation, the
value of constant attributes are set through parametrisation. If an evaluation function
was specified, the attribute value is computed whenever it is queried.
4.1.4 Views
The View is a model object which defines the behaviour of its parent component. In
particular, the view describes possible sequences of events at the interaction points of a
component, as well as internal transitions. Thereby, a View may adapt any description
formalism as described in section 2.1.3. One view is especially important for the compo-
nent based approach of the domain model. It is called the PVPartsView and provides a
graphical formalism similar to block diagrams. It describes the behaviour of a component
in terms of sub-components, called parts, and connections between their interfaces. The
parts of a PartsView describe how other components are used within a component. Parts
are modelled by PVComponentProxy model objects, which refer to a Component as their
type. Each part’s interface equals that of the referenced Component, such that connections
can be defined between parts. If the referenced Component is defined by a PartsView in
turn, this yields the next lower level in the component hierarchy. When instancing a
Component containing a PartsView, instances of each Component referenced by the parts
are added as children of the instance. According to the interconnections found between
the parts, corresponding interconnections are created between the instances. Hence, the
system model is a component instance tree, which is constructed as described by the
PartsViews. An important feature of the PartsView is the distinction into physical and
logical parts. Physical parts represent essential pieces in the decomposition of a com-
ponent into sub-components. They are implicitly and necessarily instantiated, whenever
the Component is instantiated. In contrast, logical parts are placeholders for component
instances, which may be filled in when ”integrating” a system. The instances to be filled
in are provided by an application when it is bound to a platform in order to obtain an
integrated system model. An explanation of application, platform and binding is given
later in this section.
Figure 4.4 shows the domain model of View, PVPartsView and the model objects asso-
ciated as logical and physical parts. Similar to the PVPartsView, another important type
of view is included in the domain model. It is called BaseView and adapts the behaviour
description formalism described in section 4.2. Since this is a low-level formalism, the
BaseView may be regarded as a low-level behavioural view.
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Figure 4.4: The PartsView model object and related hierarchy.
4.1.5 Ports and Methods
The interface of a Component provides interaction points for the behavioural descriptions
found in its view. Interaction points of different Components may be connected, indicating
that they synchronously share the same events. There are two categories of interaction
points: ports and methods. Ports represent the data flow between components. They have
a direction (in, out or inout) and a data type, which restricts the kind and direction of data
communicated via a port. In contrast to ports, methods represent control-flow between
components. Because of the importance of the notion of invoking a method and returning
with a result, methods are explicitly provided as modelling objects. Since methods imply
a call-return protocol, they essentially model the passing of control from the caller to the
callee and back. While ports have a direction, methods can either be provided or required.
A provided method’s body resides inside the component providing the method, such that
it may be called from other components. A required method represents a call from within
a component. Both provided and required methods have a signature, consisting of their
name, a list of parameters and a return type.
The validity of connections between interaction points is restricted depending on their
data type, signature and direction. First of all, ports must not be connected to methods
and vice versa. Furthermore, any port may be connected to at most one other port, and
the directions and data types of both ports must fit together. It is also required, that the
components of two connected ports are not of the same type. That is, only connections
between processing and communication components are allowed, such that a separate
modelling of transformation on one side, and transportation of data on the other side,
is enforced. A summary of valid port-to-port connections is presented in table 4.1. The
fields of the table represent connections between two ports having data type t1 and t2
respectively. Depending on the direction of both ports, the connection is either invalid or
restricts the relation between the data types. For example, the connection of an in-port
of type t1 to an out-port of type t1 is valid, but requires t1 to be a super-type of t2.
Figure 4.5 shows the domain model of Port and related model objects. The PartsView
uses special versions of Ports, namely PVPort and PVPortProxy. While PVPort model
objects represent the ports of the interface to the environment, PVPortProxy model ob-
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Figure 4.5: The Port model object and related hierarchy.
HHHHHHt1
t2 in out inout
in invalid t1 ⊇ t2 t1 ⊇ t2
out t1 ⊆ t2 invalid t1 ⊆ t2
inout t1 ⊆ t2 t1 ⊇ t2 t1 = t2
Table 4.1: Valid port-to-port connections.
HHHHHHt1
t2 in out inout
in t1 ⊇ t2 invalid invalid
out invalid t1 ⊆ t2 invalid
inout invalid invalid t1 = t2
Table 4.2: Valid port forward connections.
The rows and columns correspond to the dif-
ferent directions of the parent and internal
port, respectively.
jects represent the ports of parts within a PartsView. These are representatives for the
interface ports of the Component referenced by the part as its type. Restrictions for
connections between ports apply to the connectedTo association between PVPortProxy
model objects. Other rules govern the connections between PVPortProxy and PVPort
model objects. Such connectedTo associations are also called forwards and their validity
is summarised in table 4.2. In contrast to the internal connections between port proxies,
forward connections attach a port proxy — an internal port — to a port of the outer
interface — the parent port — of the component. Therefore, the direction of the internal
and parent port must be equal. Furthermore, in an input forward connection, the type
of the internal port must be a super-type of the parent port’s type, whereas in an output
forward connection, the parent port’s type must be a super-type of the internal port’s
type. For inout forward connections, the types must be equal.
Figure 4.6 shows the relations between PVProvidedMethod and PVRequiredMethod
model objects. As with ports, there are special versions of methods used within a
PartsView. The model objects PVRequiredMethod and PVProvidedMethod are repre-
sentatives for methods of the interface to the environment, also called interface methods.
In contrast PVRequiredMethodProxy and PVProvidedMethodProxy represent methods of
the interface of the part’s type Component. As shown in figure 4.6, proxy methods can be
forwarded to interface methods. This way, methods defined in the parts of a PVPartsView
are made visible to the environment of the containing Component.
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Figure 4.6: Provided and required method model objects hierarchy.
While many PVRequiredMethodProxy model objects can be forwarded to the same
PVRequiredMethod, only one PVProvidedMethodProxy can be forwarded to a PVProvid-
edMethod, always provided that their signatures agree. This restriction of forwarding is
a consequence of the requirement of a unique association of any RequiredMethod to a
ProvidedMethod. Allowing multiple forwards of PVProvidedMethodProxies to the same
PVProvidedMethod would make this association ambiguous, as illustrated in figure 4.7.
methodX()
methodX()
methodX() methodX()
partA partB
Figure 4.7: Ambiguous forwarding of a provided method.
Connections between method proxies are also restricted. This results from the require-
ment that any PVRequiredMethodProxy within a PVPartsView must be linked, either by
internally connecting it to a PVProvidedMethodProxy, or by forwarding it to the com-
ponent’s environment through a PVRequiredMethod. In both cases, the connection is
one-to-one, such that the association is again unique. On the other hand, a PVPro-
videdMethodProxy may be required by many PVRequiredMethodProxies and may be
forwarded to the environment through a PVProvidedMethod simultaneously. However,
the signatures of any pair of connected methods must match.
Example 4.1.1 The following example illustrates the use of ports and methods in the
PVPartsView. Figure 4.8 shows a Component whose behaviour is given in terms of three
parts and several interconnections. The interaction points at the border of the compo-
nent are PVPort, PVRequiredMethod and PVProvidedMethod model objects. As men-
tioned above, these are interface ports and methods, since they form the interface of the
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component. The interaction points inside PVPartsView are PVPortProxy, PVRequired-
MethodProxy and PVProvidedMethodProxy model objects. These are the representatives
for the interface interaction points of the Components referenced by the parts. 
forward connection
port−to−port connection
provided method
parts (sub−components)
parent port
internal (proxy) ports
required method
Figure 4.8: A Component with PartsView.
4.1.6 Layers, Platforms, Applications
The possibility of modelling layered platforms and applications was already mentioned as
a feature of the domain model. The next two definitions make the notion of application
and platform more precise, but they are not intended to be precise in a formal way.
Definition 4.1.1 (Application) Assume that every embedded system has a special pur-
pose. As application are understood all the components of the system, which were espe-
cially developed in order to fulfil the intended purpose. These components represent the
logical structure of the systems functionality.
Definition 4.1.2 (Platform) All components of a system, which are needed by applica-
tion components to realise their functionality are regarded as the platform. The important
notion is that the platform components and the platform itself may be called general pur-
pose, considering the intended purpose of the system. The platform represents the physical
structure of the system.
According to these definitions, an application may assume some ”basic” functionality to
exist, and rely on it to perform its purpose. Such basic functions are for example commu-
nication services, library routines or driver software, which are provided by a platform.
4.1. HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE 47
The model of a platform is either open or closed. In a closed platform model, all
required methods are internally provided, such that no forward to a required method
in the interface of the platform exists. Thus, the platform does not depend on further
functionality. An open platform may be turned into a closed one by binding it onto
a closed platform. In this case, the open platform takes on the role of an application.
However, in order to bind an application onto a platform, it is a precondition that the
application consists of components, which can be bound to the platform in question. This
is where the concept of layer becomes important.
Application Building Blocks
Platform Building Blocks
Layer
Figure 4.9: The Layer concept.
A layer can be regarded as a collection of so called platform building blocks and ap-
plication building blocks, as illustrated in figure 4.9. The rationale behind a layer is as
follows. Instead of describing a concrete platform, say ”3 hosts of type X interconnected
by a network of type Y”, the constituent elements are modelled separately, forming a
set of platform building blocks. Thereafter they can be assembled to concrete platforms
as desired. Since a platform provides the means of execution for an application, there
are inter-dependencies between platform and application building blocks. Put simply,
the platform must ”know” to some extent how to handle the constituent components an
application. A layer captures this fact by providing its own set of application build-
ing blocks. These are interwoven with the platform building blocks, which may utilise
these application building blocks in the form of logical parts. As discussed earlier, logical
parts act as placeholders for component instances — the locations where the application
”fits” into the platform. Consequently, an application must be modelled in terms of some
layer’s application building blocks in order to fit into a platform consisting of the same
layer’s platform building blocks. Of course, the application building blocks cannot be
used directly to model an application, since this would mean to provide everything to be
potentially used in a (future) application as a building block a priori. Most likely, this
is impossible. The key to the solution of this problem is an extension relation. An ap-
plication is modelled using extended versions of application building blocks. The relation
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provides a way to add application specific functionality to application building blocks,
while it ensures compatibility within the platform context.
Figure 4.10: The Instance model object and related hierarchy.
Layers are not directly represented in the domain model. Applications and platforms
are modelled as ordinary Components, whereas layers are modelled as Packages, where
the sets of application and platform building blocks are organised into two corresponding
sub-packages.
4.1.7 Binding applications to platforms
The binding of an application to a platform is captured within the system component
instance tree. Nodes of this tree are Instance model objects, which in particular can
be ComponentInstance or IntegrationInstance model objects. Each Instance can
have logical and physical children, which result from instantiating logical and physical
parts, respectively. Figure 4.10 shows the relevant portion of the instance package of the
domain model. As can be seen, the IntegrationInstance has two associations, pointing
to the instances of an application and a platform, respectively. While the application
must be a single ComponentInstance1, the platform can either be ComponentInstance
or IntegrationInstance. This way, the domain model supports the stacking of several
layers to a multi-layer platform, given that the platform building blocks of each layer are
based on the application building blocks of the next lower layer.
Each IntegrationInstance holds a mapping of application component instances to
logical children of the platform instance. This mapping is captured by the binding function
B. So far, the IntegrationInstance holds all information which is necessary to construct
a system instance tree as a result of binding an application to a platform. The construction
of this instance tree is introduced subsequently as a function called binding transformation,
which transforms a given platform instance tree according to a given binding function. The
result is a single component instance tree, where application and platform are integrated
(see figure 4.11).
1Of course, the application component instance may have itself a hierarchy, but the root instance
represents by definition the application as a whole.
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Figure 4.11: Binding an application on a platform.
In order to introduce the transformation function, some additional definitions are
required. First of all, definition 4.1.3 provides a suitable representation of component
instances, which are the major entities involved in the transformation. For the purposes
in this work, component instances are only considered as a composition of their children.
In favour of simpler notation, the definition does not model other features which are not
relevant in the sequel. Examples are component interfaces, interconnections as well as the
”capacity” of logical children, which are ignored here. Nevertheless, these can be included
into the definition in a similar way. Since they are essentially left untouched by the
binding transformation, their inclusion represents a straightforward extension. Basically,
definition 4.1.3 models component instances as trees of nodes having an unique identifier
and two kinds of children, physical and logical.
Definition 4.1.3 (Representation of ComponentInstance) Let CI be the set of com-
ponent instances. A component instance c ∈ CI is a tuple (id, TC, LC), where id ∈ ID
is a unique identifier and PC,LC ∈ P(CI) are sets of component instances referred to as
the physical and logical children, respectively. Note that P denotes the power set operator.
The set of component instances CI is co-inductively defined as the largest set satisfying
the following conditions:
• CI = ID × P(CI)× P(CI)
• ∀c ∈ CI : c /∈ children∗(c)
• ∀c1, c2 ∈ CI : c1 6= c2 ⇒ children∗(c1) ∩ children∗(c2) = ∅
There are some useful functions over CI:
childrenPC(〈id, PC, LC〉) def= PC
childrenLC(〈id, PC, LC〉) def= LC
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children(〈id, PC, LC〉) def= PC ∪ LC
children∗PC(〈id, PC, LC〉)
def
= PC ∪ {children∗PC(c)|c ∈ PC}
children∗LC(〈id, PC, LC〉)
def
= LC ∪ {children∗LC(c)|c ∈ LC}
children∗(〈id, PC, LC〉) def= children∗PC(〈id, PC, LC〉) ∪ children∗LC(〈id, PC, LC〉)
parent(ci)
def
= c|ci ∈ children(c)
parent∗(ci)
def
= parent(c) ∪ parent∗ (parent(c))
While the first condition gives rise to the set of all n-ary trees over ID, the second
condition in the above definition rules out all infinite trees by disallowing a component
instance to be part of the transitive closure of its children. The third condition ensures
that each component instance is the child of exactly one parent.
As already mentioned, one application component instance and one platform com-
ponent instance are associated with every IntegrationInstance. In the following, ap-
plication and platform instances are denoted CIA and CIP , respectively. In contrast
to the previous assertion that a platform instance can either be ComponentInstance or
IntegrationInstance, both platform and application instance are assumed to be Com-
ponentInstance model objects as in definition 4.1.3. It will become clear shortly, that
precisely the binding transformation is responsible to convert an IntegrationInstance
into a ComponentInstance by utilising binding information provided by the binding func-
tion. The next definition makes the binding function B precise. It asserts some vital
properties of B for the binding transformation to produce a valid result.
Definition 4.1.4 (Binding function) Let CIA and CIP be two component instances
which represent an application and a platform, respectively. A function B : CI 7→ CI
with the properties
1. dom(B) = CIA ∪ children∗(CIA)
2. range(B) = NONE ∪ children∗LC(CIP )
3. ∀(cA; cP ) ∈ B : cP = NONE ∨ cA extends cP
4. ∀cA ∈ dom(B), children(cA) = ∅ :
1) B(cA) 6= NONE∨
2) ∃p ∈ parent∗(cA) : B(p) 6= NONE
is called a binding function.
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According to definition 4.1.4, the domain of B is the set of all component instances that
are part of the application component instance tree. The range of B is defined as the set
of component instances which are logical children within the platform component instance
tree, plus a special element NONE. Component instances mapped to NONE by B are
not bound to any logical child of the platform instance. Property three requires that
any component is either mapped to NONE or bound to a logical child instance which it
extends. The last property asserts that every leaf node of the application instance tree is
either bound to some logical child of the platform, or one of its parent nodes is bound.
This can be imagined as making a cut sideways through the application instance tree,
cutting off the children of any node bound by B. All leaf nodes of the resulting tree are
bound, if the last property holds.
At this point, the binding transformation can be introduced as a function taking B
and CIP as arguments.
Definition 4.1.5 (Binding Transformation) Let CIP = (idP , PCP , LCP ) ∈ CI be a
platform component instance and B ∈ P(CI) the binding function. The function BT :
CI × P(CI × CI) is called binding transformation and is defined as
BT (CIP , B)
def
=
(
id
′
P ,(4.1)
{ci ∈ CI | ∃c ∈ PCP : ci = BT (c, B)}∪
{ci ∈ CI | ∃c ∈ PCP : B(ci) = c ∧ c ∈ LCP},
LCP
)
.
Note, that the binding function B can be determined by a so-called configuration algo-
rithm, which has its origins in the RODOS project [83, 67, 68], where a knowledge-based
expert system for specifying, analysing and prototyping embedded systems was devel-
oped. In this system, a configuration algorithm produces mappings from function nodes
to architecture nodes, while trying to find mappings that satisfy given functional and
non-functional requirements. Further developments in this algorithm within the presented
system model have lead to a patent submission [118].
4.2 Behaviour
The previous section was mainly concerned with system structure and the focus rested on
components, their interfaces and interconnections, as well as component instance trees.
However, it was outlined, that every component owns a View, which defines its behaviour.
The only way a PVPartsView can define behaviour is by referring to the behaviour of
other components. Obviously, the leaf nodes in the component hierarchy must contribute
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Figure 4.12: Layered behavioural description approach.
behaviour in a different way. Such behavioural descriptions are provided by other, say
”purely behavioural” views, which define behaviour in terms of a finite state machine
(FSM), a message sequence chart (MSC) or statements of some programming language.
In chapter 2 it was outlined, that there exist many formalisms for describing behaviour.
Most of them have a specific focus, such as describing communication protocols for MSC’s
or describing control for FSM’s. As a result there is no ”best” formalism, giving rise to
the following problem. It is not desired to focus on only one specific formalism, but it
is difficult to integrate different formalisms into one behavioural model. Therefore, a
layered approach to behavioural description is suggested. As illustrated in figure 4.12,
the topmost layer provides the formalisms that are primarily used to describe behaviour.
The layers below provide more primitive constructs, which are used in encodings of higher
level layers. Through the encoding, semantics of one layers constructs is defined in terms
of constructs of lower layers. Finally there must be a basic layer, where semantics is given
axiomatically.
The formalism associated with the base layer shall be called basic behavioural represen-
tation. Its theoretical foundations were presented earlier in section 2.2.2, which included
the basic pi-calculus and a type extension. In the system model at hand, an extended
version of the basic pi-calculus shall be used to define behaviour. In particular, this is a
polyadic and typed version of pi-calculus with timing extension. Thus, the complete basic
behavioural representation is obtained by adding the further extensions explained next.
First, basic values and expression in these values are integrated in the calculus, based on
the existing type extension. With these capabilities, simple computations like a + 5 can
be directly expressed, removing the need of their rather complicated modelling as basic
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pi-calculus processes. Subsequently, the time extension is presented, making the model
suitable for analyses which involve timing aspects.
4.2.1 Basic Values and Expressions
Even though the modelling of values, such as natural numbers, is possible using pi-calculus
processes, it tends to be complicated and cumbersome [78]. Therefore, an approach is to
take values and their manipulation primitive. In the previous section, the possibility
to specify concrete values within process expressions was introduced. So far, the con-
sequences on the behaviour of process expressions were not mentioned. The purpose of
this section is a detailed explanation of the meaning of basic values in process expres-
sions. Moreover, the syntax of processes is extended slightly again to contain basic value
expressions.
Names and Basic Values
The sets of names and literals representing basic values are assumed to be disjunctive. For
example, if the set of basic types includes Z, the set of literals includes all the symbols
used to denote integer numbers, i.e. {0,−1, 1, . . .}. While the literals simply ”exist”,
names must be introduced into a process expression. For non-link names, the only way to
do this is to specify the name as an object to a receive prefix. In x (i) .P , i is introduces
as a new name in P . Also link names may be introduced as objects of receive prefixes,
but they can also be free names, or created with the new operator. The latter is not
possible for non-link names, considering that Restriction in definition 2.2.9 requires
a link type to be specified. Because non-link names can only be introduced in receive
prefixes, an interesting property of processes can be observed. During the evolution of
a process, any non-link name is replaced by a basic value, as long as the ”environment”
provides only basic values at the links, where the names are introduced. For example,
consider the process
(4.2) P = i (x) .i (y) .P ′, Γ(i) = Iˆnt.
In P , i is a free link name of link type Iˆnt. The names x and y are of type Int, because
they are introduced as objects of a receive prefix whose subject is a link of type Int.
Looking at (4.2) does not reveal a concrete value of x, which therefore may be regarded as
undefined in P . However, assuming an environment which offers to engage in i by sending
a value, the situation changes as the processes evolve:
i 〈5〉.i 〈7〉 | P → i 〈7〉 |{5/x}i (y) .P ′ by Out, Inp and Comm(4.3)
→ {7/y}{5/x}P ′ by Out, Inp and Comm.(4.4)
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Now, x and y are being substituted by basic value literals, such that both become concrete
values in P ′. This resembles a black box test, where specific test data is supplied as
stimulus. Alternatively, the behaviour of P ”without environment” is also defined by the
transition rules. Using them as follows, the derived behaviour is
P i(a)−−→ {a/y}i (y) .P ′ by Inp(4.5)
i(b)−−→ {b/y}{a/x}.P ′ by Inp(4.6)
Here, the names x and y are not replaced by concrete values. They are substituted by a and
b, which are representatives for concrete values possibly specified by some environment.
As long as a or b are no value literals, they represent no concrete values. Their value is
regarded as undefined as a consequence. Definition 4.2.1 makes this precise.
Definition 4.2.1 (Undefined) Any name α : T , where T is a non-link type, is inter-
preted as being undefined within the process expression where it occurs. Being undefined
implies that α represents any possible value of T . Substitution by some basic value turns
it into a concrete value.
According to this definition there are no non-link names with defined value. The value of
a name in an expression is defined by the substitution of that name.
The situation where a process is analysed ”without” environment resembles a white
box test, where the behaviour resulting from any possible assignment of concrete values
to names is investigated. This is especially of interest, when defining a deterministic
conditional choice primitive as follows. The syntax of this primitive is given by
(4.7) Condition: P ? ::= [v] ?Pt : Pf ,
where v is a Boolean value literal, i.e. either true or false. The meaning of Condition
is simple. If v is true, the process continues with Pt, if v is false it continues with Pf .
Two transition rules
CondTrue : [true]?P : Q
τ−→ P
CondFalse : [false]?P : Q
τ−→ Q
express this formally. A drawback of this definition is, that it only works when concrete
values of v are available. As shown earlier, transition rules allow for the inference of
transitions in presence of undefined names. In particular, it is possible to derive a process
expressions like [v]?P : Q, where v is undefined. According to definition 4.2.1, v represents
both true and false. Hence, both CondTrue as well as CondFalse must be applied to
derive all possible transitions. However, doing so introduces an important problem for
the inferred continuation processes. The fact that v was taken to be true(false) before
4.2. BEHAVIOUR 55
applying CondTrue(CondFalse) does not carry over to the continuation P (Q). A simple
example makes the consequences visible. Consider the process expression [v]?x 〈v〉 : y 〈v〉.
Depending on the value of v, it is either sent via link x or via link y. Using CondTrue
and CondFalse yields
[v]?x 〈v〉 : y 〈v〉 τ−→ x 〈v〉 by CondTrue(4.8)
[v]?x 〈v〉 : y 〈v〉 τ−→ y 〈v〉 by CondFalse .(4.9)
The resulting continuation processes x 〈v〉 and y 〈v〉 express that an undefined Boolean
value can be sent. But since the choice of the continuation process deterministically
depends on v, a more precise assertion could be made: true can be sent along x and
false can be sent along y. The decision for either rule fixes the value for v. Of course,
the application of CondTrue and CondFalse as done above is not strictly legal. Fixing a
value for v should be made explicit by substituting the fixed value for v in the process
expression before applying the transition rules. Thus, the correct way of applying the
Cond-rules is
[true]?x 〈true〉 : y 〈true〉 τ−→ x 〈true〉 by CondTrue(4.10)
[false]?x 〈false〉 : y 〈false〉 τ−→ y 〈false〉 by CondFalse ,(4.11)
where the substituted process expressions are used. Now the continuation processes rep-
resent the more precise assertion made above. For a direct application, the transition
rules can be rewritten as
Condv ,True : [v]?P : Q
τ−→ {true/v}P
Condv ,False : [v]?P : Q
τ−→ {false/v}Q,
such that the substitution is part of the transition rules. However, the initial versions of
the rules are still necessary for Condition expressions with concrete values true or false.
As will be seen, this problem will be overcome when introducing basic value expressions
within processes.
Basic Value Expressions
When introducing basic values, it is natural to go one step further and also allow basic
value expressions in process expressions. Their purpose is to express calculations with
basic values, which are not intended to be modelled in pi-calculus itself. By definition,
a basic value expression is allowed in any place where a basic value is valid. Using a
separate reduction system, a basic value expression can be replaced by its (basic) value.
Since this is considered as an orthogonal issue, it is not covered here. Intuitively, the usual
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operations defined on basic types are candidates for basic value expressions. Examples
are multiplication or addition for integer numbers or the logical connectives for Boolean
values.
Basic value expressions are also allowed to contain non-link names. As demonstrated
above, these names can be substituted by values. If all names in a basic value expres-
sion were substituted by values, it is said to be closed. Every closed expression can be
completely reduced and substituted by its value. However, it is also possible that unde-
fined names occur in basic value expressions, when it is necessary to reduce them. These
expressions are called open and a reduction to a single value is not possible. Whenever
the inference of a transition requires the substitution of a name by an open basic value
expression, the name must be replaced by the whole expression. In turn, this implies the
possibility of an open expression occurring as the condition in a Condition primitive.
Another modification of the Cond rules is required to adapt to basic value expressions.
In this case, a simple substitution of a Boolean name by true or false is not possible, be-
cause the condition inside the square brackets may be a more complex Boolean expression
than just a simple name. It turns out, that the Cond-rules can be defined such that no
substitution is necessary. When the condition is ”carried over”to the continuation process,
substitution can be avoided. In order to achieve this, it is assumed that every process
has some context information, which is modified by the application of transition rules.
One example of such context information is the global time, introduced in section 4.2.2.
Each inference of an evolution transition results in a progress of the global time. In a
very similar way, the restriction of valid values of undefined names is part of the process
context. For each process, a so called global constraint records the restrictions imposed
by all conditions traversed along the path of execution which leads to that process.
Definition 4.2.2 (Global Constraint) The global constraint GC is a propositional
logic formula. It consists of the conjunction of all Boolean expressions encountered in
Conditions along the path of execution leading to the current process expression. As-
signments of values to names within the Boolean expressions which satisfy GC represent
possible values of these names in the process expression. Value assignments which do not
satisfy the global constraint represent impossible combinations, which can not occur at this
point in execution.
At the beginning of an analysis, the global constraint is simply true. If necessary, initial
preconditions or assumptions about values of names can be specified. Then, the global
constraint is carried over from state to state with the application of inference rules. Every
time a transition is inferred via CondTrue or CondFalse , the global constraint is updated
by conjunction with the current condition in normal and negated form, respectively. For
any other transition rule, the global constraint remains unchanged. Moreover, it is an
implicit premise of any inference rule that GC is satisfiable. For the Cond rules, the
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updated global constraint must be satisfiable as a premise. This removes paths from
the LTS of a process expression, which would imply unsatisfiable global constraints, and
thus impossible assignments of values to value names. The transitions of Condition are
defined as follows.
Definition 4.2.3 (Condition, syntax)
(4.12) Condition: P ? ::= [EB] ?Pt : Pf ,
where EB is a Boolean expression.
Definition 4.2.4 (Transition rules for Condition)
CondTrue : [EB]?P : Q,GC
τ−→ P, GC ∧ EB
CondFalse : [EB]?P : Q,GC
τ−→ Q, GC ∧ ¬EB
Note that GC ∧ EB and GC ∧ ¬EB must be satisfiable for valid application of the rules.
Whenever reasoning about the values of names or expressions, the global constraint must
be taken into account. Using the global constraint, the inference of deterministic tran-
sitions of processes involving basic expressions and Condition constructs is possible.
Moreover, the global constraint allows for more precise statements about values of ex-
pressions in a given state, than just asserting their type. For example, after applying
CondFalse to [EB]?P : Q, the global constraint includes ¬v. Thus, even though v is
undefined in Q, the restrictions imply that v must be false. This is the account for the
deterministic nature of the Condition construct, which would not have lead into Q, if v
had been true.
Of course this setup has some drawbacks. Clearly, whether GC = true for some
value assignment is not decidable in general, but required in the premise transition rules.
However, assuming the special case that the only basic type is Boolean, all basic expres-
sions are Boolean formulae, and consequently GC is also a pure Boolean formula. Then,
GC = true is a SAT problem, which is decidable and can be computed efficiently by SAT
solving algorithms. For other basic types, GC is not a pure Boolean formula, such that
efficient SAT algorithms might not exist. In this case, the only solution is to assume that
GC can be satisfied, and to follow a possibly impossible path of execution. Notably, the
behaviour resulting from ignoring GC in the premises of transition rules is equivalent to
the non-deterministic modelling of conditional choices in a program, using Summation
for example.
Substitution
Since the syntax of processes has been extended by basic value expressions, there are some
aspects of substitution to be discussed. The standard notion of substitution is replacement
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of names by other names or by basic values. Names may also be substituted by the value
of closed basic value expressions. Open basic value expressions require to extend this
notion by the replacement of names by expressions. There is no general problem in
replacing a name by basic value expression. However, attention must be paid for names
in expressions which are also bound names in the process subject to substitution. Also
in the untyped calculus alpha-conversion is required sometimes to perform a substitution
properly. For example, assume P = new b (a.b). Then {b/a}P = new b′ (b.b′). In the
context of basic value expressions, this notion has to be extended as follows. Whenever a
name is substituted by an open expression in some process, this process has to be alpha-
converted such that the intersection of the bound names of the process and the names
in the open expression is empty. In the process below, v is going to be substituted by
3× (x+ y). The extended substitution requires to rename the bound names x and y:
z 〈3× (x+ y)〉 | new x, y
(
z (v) .x 〈v〉.y | P
)
(4.13)
τ−→ {3×(x+y)/v}new x, y
(
x 〈v〉.y | P
)
(4.14)
≡ new x′, y′
(
x′ 〈3× (x+ y)〉.y′ | P
)
.(4.15)
Sometimes it is necessary to specify an undefined value to be the object in a send
prefix. This can be achieved by using the symbol Undefd. It has a special meaning in
substitutions, which make its notion of an undefined value precise.
Definition 4.2.5 (Undefd literal) The literal Undefd is a special symbol representing
an undefined value. In substitutions it is interpreted as
(4.16) {Undefd/x}P def={x′/x}P,
meaning that x is substituted for a fresh name x′ in P .
Thus, x will not be replaced by a concrete value in expressions of P , such that further
interpretations will treat these expressions as open and x′ as undefined.
4.2.2 Timed pi-Calculus
Process algebras are suitable to model a class of systems that can be described by a set
of states. These systems are assumed to be in a certain state at a certain time. As long
as no internal reactions or interactions with the systems environment are possible, the
system remains in its current state. If the system engages in a reaction or interaction it
may change its state. Physically, the state of a real system is always related to informa-
tion stored within the system. Thus, any transition from one state to another implies
manipulation of information in some way. A natural assumption is that manipulation of
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any information whatsoever, consumes an amount of time greater than zero. In order
to fundamentally model this assumption, the concept of time consuming transitions is
adopted to the pi-calculus.
In order to capture timing information within a process expression a syntactic exten-
sion of the pi-calculus as presented earlier is required. However, most of the original syntax
remains unchanged. Definition 4.2.6 shows the extension to the standard pi-calculus syn-
tax. The only production in addition to those of the un-timed calculus - the so called
time guard - allows specification of an interval ∆, denoting a subset of the time domain
R. The symbol ∆ is a placeholder for usual interval notations. Examples of valid timed
process expressions are: [1.2 ; 2.5]0, a〈x〉.[0 ; 5]0 and (a.[1 ; 3]0 | a.[2 ; 5]0). Notably, the syntax
disallows summation terms to begin with a time guard2, which turns out to be important
when defining the operational semantics of the calculus.
Definition 4.2.6 (Timed pi-calculus, syntax) The syntax of timed pi-calculus equals
that of basic pi-calculus, except for one additional production rule, the time guard.
Time Guard: P∆ ::= ∆P,(4.17)
where ∆ denotes a contiguous interval of R. The set of timed process expressions is called
P t.
A time consuming transition can be divided into two phases as defined below. As time
passes, the time guard decreases such that the intermediate states approach P . During
the floating phase P can be reached immediately as indicated by vertical arrows.
Definition 4.2.7 (silent) Given a time guarded process ∆P , the interval [0; inf∆) is
called silent phase. During this phase there are neither interactions with other processes,
nor internal reactions among components of P . The predicate silent on process expres-
sions is defined as
silent ∆P =
{
true : inf∆ > 0
false : otherwise
A silent process can do nothing except letting time pass.
Definition 4.2.8 (floating) Given a time guarded process ∆P , the floating phase coin-
cides with the interval ∆. The predicate floating on process expressions is defined as
floating ∆P =
{
true : inf∆ ≤ 0
false : otherwise
At any point during the floating phase there exist two possibilities for further evolution.
Firstly, the process continues to be floating and allows time to pass. Secondly, the target
state may be reached immediately.
2i.e. (a+ [1 ; 2]b) is not a valid process expression
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As in plain pi-calculus, the formal semantics of time guards is defined by a labelled transi-
tion relation d ∈ P ×R×P , called time evolution. Symbols P and R denote the sets
of process expressions and real numbers, respectively. Each element of a time evolution
is a transition labelled with a duration d ∈ T and is referred to as evolution transition.
There are five transition rules that characterise time evolution. The transition rule Prog
introduces the possibility of time progress for time guarded processes. Accordingly, ∆P
can wait for d, thereby evolve into ∆′P , where the values of ∆′ are those of ∆ decreased
by d. Valid values of d range over one of two intervals, depending on the transition phase.
During silent phase, time progress is limited to (0; inf∆]. If a process is floating, the range
of possible delays is (0; sup∆]. Reach accounts for the fact that any floating process may
reach its target state immediately. Hence, the inferred transition is labelled with d = 0.
Prog0 is a special rule concerning the inactive process. It implies that 0 can always let
time pass arbitrarily. ParProg allows composing of two processes if both have the capa-
bility to delay the same amount of time. This ensures synchronous time progress within
all components of a system. According to rule ParStable, composing a stable process and
a process that can delay d, yields a process that can delay d likewise. A process is said to
be stable, if ¬(Q →), i.e. if Q has no internal reactions. Note that Q may offer actions
to its environment, while still being stable. Special care must be taken with replication,
i.e. of expressions of the form !∆P . By structural congruence !∆P ≡ ∆P | ∆P | . . . .
Using Prog for each component and ParProg to combine them results in !∆P
sup∆ !P .
The fact that ∆!P sup∆ !P also holds, suggests that !∆P and ∆!P actually mean the same
thing. In other words, synchronous time progress in parallel components demands that
replicated time guards also decrease at the same rate. Consequently, a replicated time
guard can also be written outside the replication operator. Since terms like !∆P would
call for specific transition rules which essentially express the same behaviour, these terms
are prohibited at syntactic level. A summary of the transition rules explained above is
presented in definition 4.2.9.
Definition 4.2.9 (Time evolution) The time evolution relation {〈P, d , Q〉|P,Q ∈
P t; d ∈ R} is defined by the following transition rules:
Prog: ∆P
d (∆− d)P d∈(0; sup
∆
] Prog0 : 0
d 0 d∈R+
Reach:
floating ∆P
∆P
0 P ResProg :
P
d P ′
new −→x P d new −→x P ′
ParProg:
P
d P ′ Q d Q′
P | Q d P ′ | Q′ ParStable:
P
d P ′ ¬(Q→)
P | Q d P ′ | Q
Timed process expression are always in the context of a global time GT. Implicitly, the
consequence of each rule causes global time to proceed, i.e. P,GT d P ′,GT + d. So,
whenever a time evolution of d is inferred, the global time advances the same amount of
time d. This is omitted in the rules above in order to keep a simpler notation.
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Having operational semantics for timed process expressions at hand, it is possible to define
a timed labelled transition system induced by the transition rules. The resulting TLTS
has action transitions as well as evolution transitions.
Definition 4.2.10 (TLTS) The timed labelled transition system (TLTS) of a timed pro-
cess expression P t is a pair 〈Q, T 〉, where the set of states Q is the reflexive transitive
closure of process expressions derivable from P t by the transition rules of definition 2.2.2
and the time evolution rules of definition 4.2.9.
The ternary relation T ⊂ Q × L × Q is called the timed transition relation, where
L = Act ∪ R+ is the set of labels. Any triple 〈Q, l,Q′〉 ∈ T is written Q α−→ Q′ for
l = α ∈ Act, and Q d Q′ for l = d ∈ R+. Transitions of the form Q α−→ Q′ are referred
to as action transitions whereas transitions of the form Q d Q′ are referred to as time
evolutions.
Note that the set of labels consists of action labels Act as usual in pi-calculus, plus the
positive real numbers including zero R+.
In figure 4.13 the TLTS of process expression P
def
= ∆0a.P is shown. Each state is
represented by a rounded box containing the corresponding process expression. Symbols
∆i denote time guards of silent processes, whereas Λi denote time guards of floating
processes. For any action transition
α−→ a solid arrow labelled α is drawn between source
and target state. Evolution transitions d are depicted by dotted arrows. Their label
is either a real number equal to the transition duration d, or it is an interval denoting
a range of possible durations. Hence, transitions labelled by some interval ∆ supersede
an infinite collection of transitions, each labelled by a distinct number d ∈ ∆. As can be
seen in figure 4.13, even a simple process expression yields an infinite TLTS. However,
the states in the shaded area can be regarded as one super-state capturing the possible
behaviour. That is, all transitions to and from this state are known independently from
their context. Starting from process expression P , there are two evolution transitions.
The transition (0; inf∆0 ) leads to subsequent silent processes. As further time passes, all
evolutions finally lead to Λ0a.P , where the process floats for the first time. As stated in
definition 4.2.8 this process has two possibilities: reach the target state or consume time.
Exactly this is expressed by the evolution transitions 0 and (0; supΛ0 ) . Following the
latter, again a super-state of floating processes is entered as indicated by the lower shaded
area. All outgoing transitions 0 finally lead to a.P . The evolution transition from a.P
needs some more explanation, because this process expression alone does not allow the
inference of evolution transitions. However, by structural congruence3 a.P ≡ (a.P | 0),
such that Prog0 together with an instance of ProgStable can be used to derive arbitrary
time progress for a.P . Moreover P (0;∞) P ′ is valid for any stable process P .
3The transition rule for structural congruence of Milner is also applicable for evolution transitions,
although not explicitly given here.
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Figure 4.13: TLTS of a time guarded process.
Properties of TLTS
An interesting question about real-time systems is what the state of a system will be at
which time and which actions can or cannot be performed at which time. The answer to
such questions can be computed from the TLTS of a system as defined in 4.2.10. Given a
state S of some system, let ACTIVES be a set of times, such that at each time t ∈ ACTIVES
the state of the system is potentially S. That is, at each time t /∈ ACTIVES the system is
definitely not in state S. Define another set of times ARRIVET at which the transition T
may reach its target state. The sets ACTIVE and ARRIVE are defined as the solution to a
system of equations between these sets as follows.
Definition 4.2.11 (ACTIVES) Given the TLTS of a system 〈Q, T 〉, let ACTIVES denote
the set of times at which the system is in the state S ∈ Q:
ACTIVES =
⋃
t∈T (S)
ARRIVEt, where T (S) = {〈Q, l,Q′〉 ∈ T | Q′ = S}
is the set of incoming transitions of state S.
Definition 4.2.12 (ARRIVEt) Given the TLTS of a system 〈Q, T 〉, let ARRIVEt denote
the set of times at which the target state of transition t ∈ T can be reached:
ARRIVE〈Q,l,Q′〉 = ACTIVEQ ⊕ duration ((Q, l,Q′))
where
duration ((Q, l,Q′)) =
{
0 : l ∈ Act
l : l ∈ R+
is the duration of a transition according to its label.
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The ⊕ operation in both definitions is defined by A ⊕ d = {x |x = a+ d ∀a ∈ A}. If
the definitions 4.2.11 and 4.2.12 are applied to every state of a given TLTS, a system
of equations results. The indeterminates of this system of equations are the desired sets
ACTIVE and ARRIVE for the states and transitions of the TLTS. So, a solution consists
of sets assigned to the indeterminates such that all equations are satisfied. Doing so for
the TLTS in figure 4.13 yields the times of the states and transitions4. For notational
purposes names instead of process expressions are used to refer to the states:
P0
def
= ∆0a.P P1
def
= Λ0a.P P2
def
= a.P
The resulting system of equations is
ACTIVEP0 = ACTIVEP2 ⊕ duration ((P2, a, P0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(4.18)
ACTIVEP1 = ACTIVEP0 ⊕ duration
(
(P0, inf
∆0
, P1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=inf∆0
(4.19)
ACTIVEP2 = ACTIVEP1 ⊕ duration
(
(P0, (0; sup
Λ0
), P1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(0;supΛ0 )
(4.20)
∪ ACTIVEP2 ⊕ duration ((P2, (0;∞), P2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(0;∞)
Eliminating the recursion in ACTIVEP2 yields
ACTIVEP2 =
⋃
n∈N+
(
ACTIVEP1 ⊕ (0; sup
Λ0
)
)
⊕ n⊗ (0;∞)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(0;∞)
=
(
ACTIVEP1 ⊕ (0; sup
Λ0
)
)
⊕ (0;∞),(4.21)
where n⊗A def= A⊕ A⊕ A . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
. By substituting (4.21) in (4.18) and subsequent substitu-
tion of ACTIVEP1 with (4.19), it can be shown that the set of times at which P0 can be
active is given by
ACTIVEP0 =
(
ACTIVEP1 ⊕ (0; sup
Λ0
)
)
⊕ (0;∞)
=
((
ACTIVEP0 ⊕ inf
∆0
)
⊕ (0; sup
Λ0
)
)
⊕ (0;∞)
= ACTIVEP0 ⊕ [inf
∆0
;∞)(4.22)
4Actually, the derivation uses a simplified, but equivalent TLTS with only three states P0,1,2 and the
transition between P1 and P2 being P1
(0; supΛ0 ) P2.
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Figure 4.14: Illustration of ACTIVEP0 according to equations a) 4.22 and b) 4.23.
This result expresses that P0 can be active at the earliest inf∆0 after P0 was active and
any time after that, which is exactly what the TLTS in figure 4.13 shows intuitively. It
takes at least inf∆0 to get from P0 to P2 and back to P0, but P2 has the capability to
delay an arbitrary amount of time, such that P0 can be reached again any time later.
Figure 4.14(a) gives a graphical representation of ACTIVEP0 . An interesting case is where
P0 is in a cycle with duration [a; b] instead of [inf∆0 ;∞]), i.e.
(4.23) ACTIVEP0 = ACTIVEP0 ⊕ [a; b].
Solving this equation, it turns out that ACTIVEP0 contains all times greater than a certain
. The reason for this is simple and fits intuition. Because of the uncertain length of the
duration of [a; b], the times when P0 can be active again after leaving the state are also
uncertain. This uncertainty increases the more distant in the future one looks5. As
illustrated in figure 4.14(b), the sections where P0 is potentially active begin to overlap
when going beyond some limit . This is the point where the model can not predict
whether the system can be in a given state or not. In this example  is the least common
multiple of a and b. By examining the sets ACTIVE and ARRIVE, it can be determined
whether a system is in a certain state at a given time, which enables the formal verification
of certain real-time properties. This material was presented by the author in [107, 110].
4.3 Summary
This chapter introduced the foundations underlying the formalisms used in this work for
the description of distributed embedded systems. Models of such systems are formed by
elements of a special domain model. First, the structural aspects of this domain model
were outlined. It was explained how hierarchical systems are constructed, governed by a
component-based paradigm. A way of modelling applications, platforms as well as their
integration by means of a binding process was shown. The second part of the chapter
concentrated on the definition of behaviour and the formalism used for this purpose.
Thereby, the mathematical basis is provided by the pi-calculus, for which time and type
extensions were presented. In appendix B it is outlined, how higher-level formalisms may
be integrated as behavioural descriptions in the system model.
5The starting times of the active sections are equidistant, but their length grows with each pass of the
cycle.
Chapter 5
Formal Fault Modelling
In this chapter, a formal approach to system level fault model is introduced. Its purpose is
to provide means for a precise modelling and analysis of system behaviour in the presence
of faults. After an introduction to faults and their modelling, a calculus is developed
as the formal basis for the fault model. The calculus is an orthogonal extension to the
basic representation of system behaviour as presented in section 4.2. Expressing systems
in terms of this calculus, it becomes possible to apply concrete fault assumptions, and
study their consequences on the behaviour of the system. Finally, a formal account for
the meaning of fault tolerance is given in the context of the developed fault model.
5.1 Introduction
A common perception of a description formalism is that it describes what a system does,
instead of what the system should do. It is assumed, that what is specified, will also hap-
pen. From this point of view, a description can only be faulty by representing something
unwanted. Consequently, the first focus is to make a description correct, such that it
represents what is wanted to happen. Unfortunately, there are situations where the as-
sumptions fail, and the system does not behave as described. Thus, even if the description
was proved to be correct, the system may still exhibit faulty behaviour. There is a crucial
distinction between these notions of faultiness! The first notion corresponds to engineer-
ing errors, which can be detected and removed (at least theoretically) before the system
goes in service. A contrasting notion of fault is the second one, which is the kind of faults
to be modelled and analysed by the fault model. These faults are erratic deviations from
the specified behaviour and are caused by unexpected fault events at run-time. Possible
causes of such faults are known as hardware failures. Even if faults are likely to be caused
by real hardware failures, it is not necessary to know the precise mechanisms that lead to
faults. In order to create a model of a fault-prone system, the capability to express that
well defined portions of a system may undergo a malfunction is sufficient. Of course, the
consequences of such a malfunction must also be modelled.
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As listed in section 3.3, there are several types of fault models often used at the
system level. It is possible to formalise these fault models as program transformations,
as proposed in [16, 5, 28]. This approach is adopted in the fault model presented here by
providing a reformulation of the fault models as transformations of process expressions.
The occurrence of faults in components may or may not have influence on the expected
behaviour of the overall system. If certain component faults are anticipated, the system
can be designed, such that the faults have no visible effect to the environment. In the
context of faults as transformations, this means that the transformed system description
shows the same behaviour as the original. Systems having precautions like that in their
behavioural description are called fault-tolerant systems. The measure, whether a fault
has a visible effect, and thus whether a system tolerates that fault, can be defined in various
ways. A possible approach is to define fault tolerance with respect to a specification [5].
According to such definition a system is fault tolerant, if its fault-transformed version
also satisfies a given specification. Another possibility, which is taken here, is to define
fault tolerance based on behavioural equivalence between a system and its faulty version.
Roughly, the approach presented here is to model faults as process transformations and
then check, whether the resulting behaviour is equivalent to the original.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, the fault
calculus is developed. Section 5.3 introduces various fault models by formalising the
aforementioned faults as transformations of process expressions. In section 5.3.10, an
encoding if the component based system model into fault calculus is given. A summary
and discussion in section 5.5 conclude this chapter.
5.2 Fault Calculus
The basic representation of behaviour presented in section 4.2 purely reflects the be-
havioural aspects of a system, as the name suggests. Despite of the fact that the break-
down structure of a system into a hierarchy of components implies a corresponding be-
haviour, the structure itself is lost in the basic representation. For making assertions
about the system behaviour, the structural information is not necessary. However, the
objects of study are faults within a system. If a system suffers from faults, it is natural
to think of the sources to lie inside the system of interest and affect some portion of it.
The hierarchical structure is therefore important and cannot be neglected.
Consequently, the calculus introduced in this section is aware of a systems hierarchical
structure, which is syntactically captured in fault calculus expressions. The calculus uses
this extra information to make assertions about occurrences of faults within a system,
about their sources and their consequences. Hence the name, fault calculus. The calculus
may be seen as an orthogonal extension to the basic behavioural representation, which
was presented in chapter 2. That is, any expression of the basic representation is also an
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expression of fault calculus, including equivalent semantics. Expressions of fault calculus
are like augmented versions of basic representation expressions. For this purpose, there
is a new syntactic element, the so called Partition. It is a process expression of the
form [P ]C , which is some process expression enclosed in brackets. The index attached to
the closing bracket uniquely identifies the partition. The syntax allows for the nesting
of Partition-terms, such that hierarchical partition structures can be expressed. A
partition, which does not contain further partition is sometimes called a leaf partition.
Definition 5.2.1 (Fault calculus, syntax) The syntax of fault calculus expressions is
given in the equations below. The index C is taken from the set of component identi-
fiers CI. Basically, the syntax is the same as the typed pi-calculus with time, with the
Partition rule added. The set of process expressions induced by the syntax is called Ps.
pi-Process P s ::= PΣ P | P ν P ! P 0 P [](5.1)
Prefixed Process: P act ::= α.P(5.2)
Action prefix: α ::= λ
∣∣∣ τ(5.3)
λ ::= x (y)
∣∣∣ x 〈y〉(5.4)
Summation: PΣ ::= P act
(
+ P act
)
∗(5.5)
Parallel Composition: P | ::= P s
(
| P s
)
∗(5.6)
Replication: P ! ::=!P s(5.7)
Restriction: P ν ::= new x : L P s(5.8)
Inaction: P 0 ::= 0(5.9)
Condition P ? ::= [E] ?P s : P s(5.10)
Time Guard: P∆ ::= ∆P s(5.11)
Partition: P [] ::= [P s]C(5.12)
Any fault calculus expression has a basic representation counterpart. There is a func-
tion [[]]unpartition : Ps → P , which transforms a structured process expression into an
unstructured process expression. Intuitively, this function removes the brackets around
any Partition-term in P s. The unpartition function can be regarded as encoding of
fault calculus expressions into the basic representation, of course by loosing the structural
information.
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Definition 5.2.2 (Unpartition) The function [[]]unpartition : Ps → P is inductively de-
fined by the following equations.
[[P s]]unpartition
def
= [[P []]]unpartition [[P
| ]]unpartition [[PΣ]]unpartition(5.13)
[[P act]]unpartition [[P
ν ]]unpartition [[P
!]]unpartition
[[P ?]]unpartition [[P
∆]]unpartition [[P
0]]unpartition
[[[P ]D]]unpartition
def
= [[P ]]unpartition(5.14)
All terms but the first at the right hand side of (5.13) are defined straightforward by
applying [[]]unpartition to the sub-terms of the argument expression. The only exception is
defined in (5.14), where the brackets are removed, turning the whole into a base expression.
For example, [[
[P ]C1 | [Q]C2
]
C
]
unpartition
= P | Q,
and [[
Q | P
]
C
]
unpartition
= Q | P.
As can be seen, there is an 1 to many relation between a basic expression and fault calculus
expressions. In fact, there are infinitely many partitionings of any basic expression. For
each of them, unpartition yields the same basic expression, up to structural congruence
(≡). The example above illustrated that because P | Q ≡ Q | P .
Definition 5.2.3 (Partitioning) A process expression P s ∈ Ps is called a partitioning
of P ∈ P, iff P = [[P s]]unpartition .
Before defining the semantics of fault calculus formally, here is an informal description.
It was shown that any expression of fault calculus has a corresponding basic expression.
Two corresponding expressions shall describe the same behaviour. However, there is
additional behaviour of the fault calculus expression due to faults. The possible sources
of faults are considered to be Partitions. If a Partition suffers a fault, its subsequent
behaviour shall be corrupted in some way. However, a fault can only be observed in the
presence of observable behaviour. As long as a partition can solely react, no fault can
manifest itself outside the partition. This shall be possible only at the moment a partition
would engage in an interaction with its environment. At this point it is necessary to
introduce a distinction between two notions of behaviour. First, there is the intended
behaviour, which the system should expose ideally. This is the behaviour according to
the system description, and is called nominal behaviour. In reality, there may be faulty
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behaviour, due to faults. Nominal behaviour is everything that can be expressed using pi-
calculus plus the extensions presented in chapter 2. For the modelling of faulty behaviour,
it is necessary to represent the system in terms of fault calculus by using an appropriate
partitioning. The resulting system representation, nominal as well as faulty behaviour
can be inferred by the fault calculus transition rules. The following two definitions make
the notions of nominal and faulty behaviour precise.
Definition 5.2.4 (Fault Calculus, semantics) The nominal transitions 〈P, α,Q〉, with
P,Q ∈ Ps are those that can be inferred from the Nom-rules. Nominal transitions repre-
sent nominal behaviour. The fault transitions 〈P,F , Q〉, P,Q ∈ Ps are those that can be
inferred from the Fault-rules. Fault transitions represent faulty behaviour.1
Nom1 :
P
α−→ P ′
[P ]D
α−→ [P ′]D
Nom2 :
P
d P ′
[P ]D
d [P ′]D
FaultOpen :
[P ]D
λ−→ [P ′]D
[P ]D
F−→ [F(P )]D
F ∈ lfa(D)
FaultClosed :
[P ]D
λ−→ [P ′]D C([P ]D) τλ−→ C ′([P ′]D)
C([P ]D)
F−→ C([F(P )]D)
F ∈ lfa(D)
The NOM rules in definition 5.2.4 define that whenever a given process expression has
a transition, either external or internal, the same process placed into a partition also
possesses this transition. By analogy, the same holds for time evolutions. Proposition 5.2.1
asserts that [P ]D has at least the same capabilities as P . TheNOM rules essentially ensure
that this proposition is true. The latter is required for the proof of theorem 5.2.1, which
states that partitionings of any process expression have the same nominal behaviour.
The Fault rules use a fault function F in order to derive the process expression
resulting from a fault. In section 5.3 it will be shown how faults can be modelled using
specific fault functions.
Definition 5.2.5 (Fault function) A fault function is a function F : P s → P s over
processes. Thus, F is a transformation of structured process expressions. It models the
effect of a fault on the behaviour of the given process expression.
There are two different fault rules, FaultOpen and FaultClosed. The open form of the rule
is used to derive fault transitions for partitions without considering a surrounding context.
This is useful for faults which manifest themselves at the outer system border, which has
1See definition 5.3.1 for lfa, used by the some of the fault rules.
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no context by definition. When analysing faults that occur within the considered system,
the closed form of the fault rule must be applied. Then, a specific partition produces
the fault, whereas the surrounding system is considered as the context. The premises of
the FaultClosed rule model the requirement, that a fault can only manifest itself, if the
partition can engage in an interaction with its context2. Therefore, it is first required
that a given partition [P ]D offers a transition, where the origin is an input or output
prefix λ. Secondly, a given one hole context C must have the property that C([P ]D)
has got a silent transition
τλ−→ , involving the same input or output prefix λ. This
second premise is implicitly assumed to be satisfied by default when using FaultOpen. In
essence, the consequences of both fault rules state that a fault manifests itself as a fault
transition , where the considered partition is applied to the fault function to produce the
target process expression. As a side condition, partition D must have F in its local fault
assumption lfa, which is to be defined later in section 5.3. Since F is applied to the original
partition to form the target process of the fault transition, the subsequent behaviour may
be influenced by the fault, which is of course desired and makes this approach to fault
modelling possible.
Proposition 5.2.1 For any basic process P ∈ P and the partitioning [P ]D, there exists
a strong simulation S, such that PS[P ]D.
Proof:
1. Given that P
α−→ P ′, there is [P ]D α−→ [P ′]D by inference rule Nom1.
2. Given that P d P ′, there is [P ]D d [P ′]D by inference rule Nom2.
Using the same argument proves that P ′S[P ′]D as required by the definition of strong
simulation. Hence, PS[P ]D holds. 
Proposition 5.2.2 There exists a strong simulation S, such that C(P ) S C([P ]D) for
any context, i.e. C(P ) is simulated by C([P ]D).
Proof: Since any context can be formed as a combination of elementary contexts, it is
enough to show that strong simulation is preserved by all elementary contexts. The proof
is case by case for all elementary contexts as in definition A.1.
C = ◦|Q : Prove that S = {(P | Q, [P ]D | Q) | P,Q ∈ P} is a strong simulation. Propo-
sition 5.2.1 states that P is simulated by [P ]D. Thus, P
α−→ P ′ ⇒ [P ]D α−→ [P ′]D.
Furthermore by Par, whenever P
α−→ P ′, there is a transition P | Q α−→ P ′ | Q′,
as well as [P ]D | Q α−→ [P ′]D | Q′. Assuming that (P | Q, [P ]D | Q) ∈ S, requires
(P ′ | Q′, [P ′]D | Q′) to be element of S as well. This is the case since S contains all
pairs of this form according to its definition. Hence, S is a strong simulation.
2See definition A.1.
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C = ◦+Q, C = α.◦, C = new x : T (◦), C =!◦, : The proofs for these contexts follow ex-
actly the same scheme.
It follows that C(P ) S C([P ]D). 
Theorem 5.2.1 (Behavioural Enlargement) For any two processes P s and P , when-
ever P = [[P s]]unpartition , there exists a strong simulation S, such that PSP s.
Proof: Proposition 5.2.2 guarantees that replacing a process Q by [Q]D in any context
simulates the original context. Choose an arbitrary term Q of P , define C to be the
surrounding context. By proposition 5.2.2, P = C(Q) S C([Q]D) = P ′, i.e. PSP ′. This
can be repeated until P ′ = P s, such that by transitivity of simulation, PSP s. Since
P = [[P s]]unpartition , it follows that [[P s]]unpartitionSP s. 
Theorem 5.2.1 tells that for any process P s, [[P s]]unpartition has a subset of the set of
transitions of P s. Conversely, this states that P s behaviourally enlarges [[P s]]unpartition .
Disallowing the Fault rule would result in [[P s]]unpartition being strongly bisimilar to P s.
To this end, the fault transitions are exactly the additional (faulty) behaviour.
5.3 Fault Models
The terms fault assumption and fault model are often used interchangeably. However, a
slight distinction will be made in the following. The term fault model is used whenever
the focus is on the effects and consequences of a fault, when it occurs. In particular,
local fault model refers to a transformation function, such as the ones defined below. In
contrast, the term fault assumption is used for the assignment of local fault models to
partitions. This refers to the definition of which faults are to be considered for a certain
fault calculus expression. However, the fault assumption gives rise to the overall fault
model.
5.3.1 Local Fault Assumptions
The local fault assumption defines which faults a partition may experience. It is formally
defined as a function from partition identifiers to sets of fault models. The specification of
this function, and thus the fault assumption, is part of the system modelling process. In
section 5.3.10 it is explained, how the necessary information is integrated into the system
model.
Definition 5.3.1 (Local Fault Assumption) The local fault assumption is a function
lfa : CI → P(Ps → Ps). The pair lfa(C) = ∅ denotes the fault free assumption for the
partition identified by C.
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The local fault assumption can be viewed as a matrix, where the rows correspond to
partitions and the columns correspond to faults. Any non-empty field in the matrix
indicates that the fault of the column is assumed to be possible for the partition in the
row.
As mentioned in chapter 3, there are several fault models that are frequently used in
literature, but there is no common agreement about a precise definition of these mod-
els. Nonetheless, some formal definitions exist. In [28], the author formalises faults as
program transformations, based on the observation that any fault can be mimicked by
appropriately modifying the program. These transformations essentially add additional
statements, such that the informally described effects of the faults become part of the
program behaviour. Since the author of [28] uses abstract state machines to represent be-
haviour, the definitions of faults presented there are not directly applicable to the process
algebraic representation of behaviour used here. However, following the idea of faults as
transformations, the subsequent definitions provide a formal basis of fault models in the
context of process algebras in general, and in the context of fault calculus in particular.
The mathematical representation of a fault model is a fault function, which was already
defined in section 5.2. To keep the notation simple and uniform, the specification of fault
functions in the following sections are provided in the same style as the semantic encodings
in appendix B. Just as semantic encodings give meaning to a formalism, fault functions
may be regarded as defining the semantics of faults.
5.3.2 Fail-stop
The Fail-stop fault model is a very simple fault model. It is based on the assumption,
that it is very easy and always possible for any partition to detect fail-stop of another
partition. This is a rather optimistic assumption which is difficult to achieve in a real
system. However, this model can serve as a starting point for the design and analysis of
fault tolerant algorithms, and may be relaxed (to a mode realistic fault model) in a later
refinement.
Definition 5.3.2 (Fail-stop) The Fail-stop fault model is represented by the fault func-
tion FFS. It maps the behaviour of any partition to repeatedly sending at the special link
stopC. This allows an arbitrary number of partition to receive at this link, and concluding
that the corresponding partition has stopped.
[[[P s]C ]]FFS
def
= [ ! stopC ]C(5.15)
The dedicated link stopC is implicitly defined by the semantic encoding of partition C.
To take advantage of this model, partitions may listen at stopC to detect Fail-stop of
partition C. If the fault assumption is relaxed, such that stopC is not available anymore,
the ”detection” must be replaced by a more advanced mechanism.
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5.3.3 Crash
The Crash fault assumption may be seen as a relaxed version of the Fail-stop assumption.
The affected partition stops any interaction with its environment. Instead of answering
at some dedicated stopC channel, it falls completely silent. The occurrence of a Crash
cannot be determined directly by other processes, who must conclude the crash from
missing interaction. Thus, it is much more difficult to detect a Crash compared to fail-
stop. Nevertheless, this fault assumption is much more likely to be valid for a real system.
Definition 5.3.3 (Crash) In the crash fault model, the behaviour of any partition is
mapped to inaction.
[[[P s]C ]]FC
def
= [0]C(5.16)
5.3.4 Send Omission
A common fault assumption is that of a lossy channel , a channel which may drop mes-
sages. That is, at the sending end of a channel, a message is emitted, and under nor-
mal conditions the same message is received at the receiving end. Dropping messages
means that a message was sent, but for some reason, it did not appear to the receiver.
In the base representation, channels are names which processes synchronously access.
Assume two processes P = x 〈y〉.P ′ and Q = x (z) .Q′, which are composed to P | Q.
Under normal conditions, there is only one reaction marking the sending of y along x, i.e.
P | Q → P ′ |{y/z}Q. A model for message dropping should also have a transition like
P | Q → P ′ | x (y)Q, where the receiving end still waits for the message, while the send-
ing end proceeds. Using the fault function FSO, fault calculus allows for the inference of a
transition as desired above, with the restriction that the sending and receiving end must
not be in the same partition. More precisely, the send prefix must be within a partition,
say D, for which the send omission fault assumption is defined to hold, i.e. FSO ∈ lfa(D).
Additionally, the receive prefix must reside in the context of that partition.
Definition 5.3.4 (Send Omission) The transformation for the send omission fault model
is given by the fault function FSO. It is inductively defined by the following equations. For
some arguments, FSO makes use of the identity function on process expressions I(P ) def= P .
[[P s]]FSO
def
= [[P []]]FSO [[P
| ]]FSO [[PΣ]]FSO [[P ν ]]FSO(5.17)
[[P !]]FSO [[P
?]]I [[P∆]]I [[P 0]]I [[τ.P ]]I
[[x 〈y〉.P ]]FSO [[x (y) .P ]]I
[[[P s]C ]]FSO
def
= [[[P s]]FSO ]C(5.18)
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[
P
(
| P
)
∗
]
FSO
def
= [[P ]]FSO
(
| [[P ]]FSO
)
∗(5.19)
[
P act
(
+ P act
)
∗
]
FSO
def
= [[P act]]FSO
(
+ [[P act]]FSO
)
∗(5.20)
[[new x : L (P s)]]FSO
def
= new x : L ([[P s]]FSO)(5.21)
[[!P ]]FSO
def
= [[P ]]FSO | !P(5.22)
[[x 〈y〉.P ]]FSO
def
= τ.P(5.23)
As defined by equations (5.18) to (5.22), FSO is recursive for these arguments. The
recursion terminates for all other arguments. Equation (5.23) simply skips the send prefix,
which constitutes the core of the send omission fault. Only first occurrences of send
prefixes are omitted, whereas subsequent send prefixes remain unchanged. In fact, the
whole continuation process remains unchanged.
Example 5.3.1 A small example illustrates the effect of FSO. Assume a partition A =
[(x.P | y.Q | r.R)]C . Furthermore, assume there is a context C[], which is capable of
engaging in x, y and r. Thus, the nominal behaviour of C[A] consists of three possible
transitions, namely
x−→ , y−→ and r−→ , which means this partition has the capability of
sending at either x or y, or receiving at r. However, if FSO is assumed for C, fault calculus
gives another transition, which is the fault transition A
FSO−−→ A′. Figure 5.1 illustrates
the scenario. According to definition 5.3.4, the resulting process expression reads A′ =
FSO(A) = [(P | Q | r.R)]C . Hence, the capabilities of A′ lack the send transitions, only
the receiving remains. All transitions after the send prefixes in A are also transitions of
A′. This is precisely the effect of the send omission fault model. 
FSO
x y
α2α1 α2α1
A’A
r
QRP
r
QRP
τ τ
Figure 5.1: A partition suffering a send omission fault.
5.3.5 Receive Omission
At a first glance, receive omission appears to be the complement to send omission. While
in send omission the sending process proceeds and the receiving process waits, receive
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omission would mean the opposite. But apparently, this does not model message dropping
at all. In contrast, new messages are induced in the channel by other means as the sender.
The receiver gets a message, which was not sent by the sender. This poses a severe problem
for the semantics of the receiving processes in this case. What should be done with the
bound name(s) created in the receive prefix? Again assume two processes P = x 〈y〉.P ′
and Q = x (z) .Q′, which are composed P | Q. Under normal conditions, the transition
rule defines the objects of the receive prefix (z) to be substituted by the objects of the
corresponding send prefix (y). In the case of receive omission, the transition would look
like P | Q → x 〈y〉.P ′ |{?/y}Q′. What should be the substitution, if y was actually not
sent? If channel x is a link of unit type ?ˆ, no substitution is necessary because nothing
was exchanged. This models a signalling channel where the transmitted messages have
no content. However, if x is of type Tˆ, T 6= ?, the transmitted messages do have content.
What should be assumed about the content in case of receive omission? The strongest
possible assumption is that the value of the message is some member of the domain the
channel can carry. In terms of the calculus this means, that the names of the receive
prefix may be substituted by any value of their type, which amounts to a substitution
with Undefd. While this solves the problem for value types, care must be taken for link
types. The implications of replacing link type names with Undefd are beyond the scope
of this chapter.
Definition 5.3.5 (Receive omission) The transformation for the receive omission fault
model is given by the fault function FRO. It is very similar to the definition of FSO; it
differs only in the transformation of the send and receive prefixes.
[[P s]]FRO
def
= [[P []]]FRO [[P
| ]]FRO [[PΣ]]FRO [[P ν ]]FRO(5.24)
[[P !]]FRO [[P
?]]I [[P∆]]I [[P 0]]I [[τ.P ]]I
[[x 〈y〉.P ]]I [[x (y) .P ]]FRO
[[[P s]C ]]FRO
def
= [[[P s]]FRO ]C(5.25) [
P
(
| P
)
∗
]
FRO
def
= [[P ]]FRO
(
| [[P ]]FRO
)
∗(5.26)
[
P act
(
+ P act
)
∗
]
FRO
def
= [[P act]]FRO
(
+ [[P act]]FRO
)
∗(5.27)
[[new x : L (P s)]]FRO
def
= new x : L ([[P s]]FRO)(5.28)
[[!P ]]FRO
def
= [[P ]]FRO | !P(5.29)
[[x (y) .P ]]FRO
def
= {Undefd/x}P(5.30)
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As defined by equations (5.25) to (5.29), FRO is recursive for these arguments. The
recursion terminates for all other arguments. Equation (5.30) skips the receive prefix,
which constitutes the core of the receive omission fault. Thereby, the names of the receive
prefix are substituted by Undefd. Only first occurrences of receive prefixes are omitted,
whereas subsequent receive prefixes remain unchanged.
Example 5.3.2 The following example illustrates the effect of the receive omission fault
assumption. Let P = x 〈5〉.P ′ and Q = x (v) .[v < 10]?Q1 : Q2. Nominal behaviour allows
for the derivation of
P | Q → P ′ |{5/v}[v < 10]?Q1 : Q2 by Out, Inp and Comm(5.31)
≡ P ′ | [5 < 10]?{5/v}Q1 :{5/v}Q2 by Def. 4.2.5(5.32)
= P ′ | [true]?{5/v}Q1 :{5/v}Q2 basic value exp. reduction(5.33)
→ P ′ |{5/v}Q1,GC = GC ∧ true, by CondTrue(5.34)
which is shown on the left side in figure 5.2. Now consider two partitions [P ]A and [Q]B.
The above derivation is still valid for their derivation, except that the respective terms
appear as partitions. If receive omission is assumed for partition B, i.e. lfa(B) = {FRO},
there is the derivation
[P ]A | [Q]B FRO−−→ [P ]A | [{Undefd/v}[v < 10]?Q1 : Q2]B by Fault(5.35)
≡ [P ]A | [[v′ < 10]?{Undefd/v}Q1 :{Undefd/v}Q2]B by Def. 4.2.5(5.36)
→ [P ]A | [{Undefd/v}Q1]B, GC = GC ∧ v′ < 10 by CondTrue(5.37)
and the second transition
→ [P ]A | [{Undefd/v}Q2]B, GC = GC ∧ v′ ≥ 10, by CondFalse(5.38)
which is shown on the right side of figure 5.2. Thus, because of the fault assumption,
the faulty behaviour includes both alternatives of the condition Q1 and Q2, which was
not the case for the nominal behaviour. The global constraint restricts the values of v′
in [{Undefd/v}Q1]B and [{Undefd/v}Q2]B. Moreover, [P ]A still offers to send at x after the fault
transition
FRO−−→ .
Another crucial point exploited by this example is the following. The receive omission
fault not only makes both choices of the condition primitive possible, it also ”disconnects”
v from where it came from. Under fault free circumstances, v would be replaced either
by a basic value, like in equation (5.32) above, or by another name. If it were replaced
by another name, say x, it still would be an undefined name after the substitution. But
in this case, x must have been received at the considered system boundary earlier. Thus,
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the process where v was substituted by x has a connection to stimulus data provided to
the system. In contrast, after the fault transition this connection to the original stimulus
does not exist; v is replaced by a fresh name v′. Even if the possible values of v′ might be
restricted by the global constraint, it can not be related to previous inputs. This conforms
to the intuitive notion of receive omission, where the receiving process proceeds with an
arbitrary value. 
b)a)
(5.34)(5.34)
(5.31) (5.31)
(5.35) (5.37)
(5.38)
Figure 5.2: Comparison of a) nominal and b) faulty behaviour with FRO. Note, that the
numbers in parenthesis refer to the equations, where the corresponding transition was
derived.
5.3.6 General Omission
The general omission fault model is obtained by combining send and receive omission fault
models. Together, they include the crash fault model with respect to weak bisimulation.
That is, assuming FGO for any partition C, its faulty version FGO(C) has a trace, which
has no observable actions. Only reactions may occur within the partition, leaving it
bisimilar to 0, the crash case.
Definition 5.3.6 (General omission) The transformation for the general omission fault
model is given by the combination of the send and receive omission transformations
FGO def= FSO ◦ FRO,
where ◦ denotes the functional composition operator.
5.3.7 Byzantine
The worst case scenario is the Byzantine fault model. It allows a faulty partition to behave
arbitrarily. In particular, arbitrary behaviour shall mean that a process has the capability
to copy the behaviour of any other process, which is using the same set of free names.
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Hence, there must be a simulation relation between the Byzantine process and any other
process with the same free names. The definition below takes into consideration only
those names, that are free in the process at the moment the Byzantine fault transition
occurs. Names received in the course of Byzantine behaviour are not subjects of future
sends or receives. That is,. the ”interface” of a Byzantine process does not change.
Definition 5.3.7 (Byzantine) The Byzantine fault model is defined as
(5.39) [[P s]]FB
def
= !
(
Πx∈fn(P s)
(
x 〈Undefd〉
∣∣∣ x (y))) .
It is possible to adapt the definition for a type system containing i/o-types. In this case,
sending is not possible at an input type, whereas receiving is not possible at an output
type.
[[P s]]FB
def
= !
(
Πx∈fn(P s)
({
x 〈Undefd〉 if Γ ` x : oT
0 otherwise
∣∣∣ {x (y) if Γ ` x : iT
0 otherwise
))
,
where oT and iT denote output and input types, respectively. Thus, a Byzantine process
has the capability to send or receive at any free name in the original process in any possible
order. The values sent along the links are undefined.
5.3.8 Partial Fault Models
In some situations it may be valid to consider only specific communication links to be
affected by faults. The fail-stop and crash fault models can not take advantage of this
notion, since they always affect a whole partition. In the omission and Byzantine fault
models, the effects of the fault are related to send and receive prefixes. Thus it is sensible
to consider only some of the names used in prefixes, rather than all of them. This allows
for more precise fault assumptions of the form: ”Partition C may suffer send omissions at
name x.” The definitions of partial fault assumptions are simple extensions of the total
ones. The partial fault models have the form [[P ]]AF , where A ⊆ fn(P ) is the set of names
affected by the fault in question. The definitions of the partial fault models are equivalent
to their total counterparts, except for the shown differences.
Definition 5.3.8 (Partial Send Omission) The partial send omission fault model is
derived from definition 5.3.4 by replacing equation (5.23) with
(5.40) [[x 〈y〉.P ]]AFSO
def
=
{
x ∈ A : τ.P
x 6∈ A : x 〈y〉.P.
All other equations are obtained by replacing any occurrence of [[ ]]FSO with [[ ]]
A
FSO.
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Definition 5.3.9 (Partial Receive Omission) The partial receive omission fault
model is derived from definition 5.3.5 by replacing equation (5.30) with
(5.41) [[x (y) .P ]]AFSO
def
=
{
x ∈ A : τ.P
x 6∈ A : x (y) .P.
All other equations are obtained by replacing any occurrence of [[ ]]FRO with [[ ]]
A
FRO.
Definition 5.3.10 (Partial General Omission) The partial general omission fault
model is given by the combination of the partial send and receive omission transformations
FAGO
def
= FASO ◦ FARO.
Definition 5.3.11 (Partial Byzantine) The Byzantine fault model is defined as
(5.42) [[P s]]AFB
def
= ! (Πx∈A (x 〈Undefd〉 | x (y))) ,
which is equivalent to definition 5.3.7 with the indexing set replaced by A. An adaption
to i/o-types is also possible but omitted here.
5.3.9 Value Fault Models
An important class of faults are due to the corruption of communicated values. In contrast
to the omission fault models, the causality of messages is not affected in this fault model.
It is purely concerned with modelling the possibility that the received value differs from
the value that was originally sent.
Definition 5.3.12 (Send Corruption) The send corruption fault model is obtained
from definition 5.3.4 by replacing equation (5.23) with
(5.43) [[x 〈y〉.P ]]FSC
def
= x 〈Undefd〉.P.
Definition 5.3.13 (Receive Corruption) The receive corruption fault model is ob-
tained from definition 5.3.5 by replacing equation (5.30) with
(5.44) [[x (y) .P ]]FRC
def
= x (y) .{Undefd/y}P.
Definition 5.3.14 (General Corruption) The general corruption fault model is de-
fined as the combination of the send and receive corruption transformations
(5.45) FGC def= FSC ◦ FRC.
As with the omission and Byzantine fault models, the value fault models have an analogous
extension as partial fault models.
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Example 5.3.3 In order to illustrate the difference between the omission and corruption
fault models, example 5.3.2 is revisited. While the fault assumption was previously re-
ceive omission, it is now lfa(B) = {FRC}. The resulting fault transition and subsequent
transitions derive as follows
[P ]A | [Q]B FRC−−→ [x 〈5〉.P ′]A | [x (v) .{Undefd/v}[v < 10]?Q1 : Q2]B by Fault
(5.46)
→ [P ′]A | [{5/v}{Undefd/v}[v < 10]?Q1 : Q2]B by Out,Inp,Comm(5.47)
≡ [P ′]A | [{5/v}[v′ < 10]?{Undefd/v}Q1 :{Undefd/v}Q2]B(5.48)
≡ [P ′]A | [[v′ < 10]?{Undefd/v}Q1 :{Undefd/v}Q2]B by Def. 4.2.5(5.49)
→ [P ′]A | [{Undefd/v}Q1]B, GC = GC ∧ v < 10, by CondTrue(5.50)
and the second reaction for 5.49
→ [P ′]A | [{Undefd/v}Q2]B, GC = GC ∧ v ≥ 10 by CondFalse .(5.51)
As opposed to receive omission, there is a reaction after the fault transition, which causes
the normal transmission of the value, such that the sender proceeds with its execution.
However, the substitution caused by the fault replaces the received value with an undefined
one, which models the corruption of the received value. The implications for the receiving
side in (5.50) and (5.51) are the same as in the receive omission example, equations (5.37)
and (5.38) 
Table 5.1 shows the differences between omission and corruption faults at a glance.
nominal omission corruption
send x 〈y〉.P τ.P x 〈Undefd〉.P
receive x (y) .P {Undefd/y}P x (y) .{Undefd/y}P
Table 5.1: Comparison of omission and corruption fault models.
5.3.10 Encoding of Components in Fault Calculus
How can the component-based modelling approach take advantage of the proposed fault
model? Having the definition of a fault calculus and a fault model at hand, it is fairly
straightforward to integrate them into the modelling approach. In fact it is only required
to redefine the component instance encoding.
In the system model presented in chapter 4, a system is finally represented as a tree
of component instances. This is the result of composition. In order to obtain overall
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behaviour of a system consisting of component instances, it is necessary to define their
encoding into the basic representation. That is, it is necessary to make the system descrip-
tion formalism closed under composition. The standard encoding scheme of a component
instance CI is given by3
[[CI]] def= Πc∈PC [[c]].
In this simplified version, interconnections between the children of CI are ignored. The
important fact about this encoding is that child components are arranged in a parallel
composition. While the encoding defines the behaviour of the overall system, its internal
composition structure is lost completely. Without this information, there is no sensible
way to define a fault assumption. Using fault calculus, it is possible to map the component
hierarchy of a system to nested partitions. A corresponding encoding scheme can success-
fully preserve the structural information contained within a system model. Thereby, the
nominal behaviour remains unchanged, based on the behavioural enlarging property. The
semantics of fault calculus adds fault transitions according to the fault assumptions, as
desired.
Definition 5.3.15 (Structured Component Encoding) Structural component encod-
ing is based on the standard component encoding. By placing each standard component
encoding into a partition, the component instance hierarchy of a system is mapped in a
one-to-one fashion onto a hierarchy of partitions.
(5.52) [[CI]]S def= [Πc∈PC [[c]]S]id
Figure 5.3 shows a component diagram, in which component C consists of two sub-
components C1 and C2. Assume two arbitrary processes P and Q as defining the be-
haviour of C1 and C2 respectively. Then the diagram is represented by the fault calculus
expression shown next to it.
Basic encoding: P | QC
(P) (Q)
C1 C2
Structured encoding: [ [P ]C1 | [Q]C2 ]C
Figure 5.3: An example component C with two sub-components C1, C2 and the corre-
sponding structured calculus expression.
3This is a simplified version of the standard encoding. Normally, the interconnections between com-
ponents are encoded by introduction of new names and substitution.
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5.3.11 Global Fault Assumptions
In contrast to the local fault assumption, the global fault assumption asserts general prop-
erties about the occurrence of faults. A prominent example is the assumption, that only
one component fails at any time instant. Under this assumption, at least one time evo-
lution transition, marking an advancement of time, must be inferred before applying the
Fault rule again after a previous fault transition. Thus, global fault assumptions reduce
the number of possible fault transitions. This is an important fact, since unrestricted
application of the Fault rules can lead to large numbers of inferred faults, which are
reasonable to be ruled out (by the global fault assumptions) in a realistic fault scenario.
Another possibility is to analyse a single fault, by assuming that this fault occurs only
once. However, a formal framework for global fault assumptions is beyond the scope of
this work.
5.4 Fault Tolerance
5.4.1 Definition of Fault tolerance
When is a system considered to be fault tolerant? An informal answer could be:
A system is fault tolerant, if faults have no effect on its correct operation.
This is an intuitive starting point for a more precise definition of fault tolerance. There are
at least two things that need to be clarified. In the previous section, it was already defined
what faults are, and fault calculus formalises how they influence behaviour. The question
is, which faults are to be considered? Instead of asking for tolerance of any fault in
general, it seems to be a better approach to define a set of faults under consideration, and
to ask for tolerance with respect to this set. The local fault assumption of definition 5.3.1
provides such sets for the components of a system. Furthermore it is necessary to define
a reference for correct behaviour. Since a fault results in corrupted behaviour, there must
be some way to determine whether the corrupted behaviour can be designated as correct
or not.
The latter problem will be investigated first. Assume a system is given by an expres-
sion A. A fault F may lead to a fault transition into the state AF , i.e. A F−→ AF .
Intuitively, the corrupted system AF should return to the expected behaviour by zero or
more reactions −→* (the transitive reflexive closure of −→ ). These reactions are thought
of as the reaction of the system to the fault, namely its detection and correction. That is,
AF −→* B, such that BSA, where S is some equivalence relation. The scenario is shown
in figure 5.4. This diagram is only a snapshot of the system in state A, where a fault F
is possible. Fault tolerance requires that similar diagrams exist for any fault possible in
state A. The same holds for subsequent states reachable from A. The important notion
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AF
F−→ ↓∗
A S B
Figure 5.4: A scenario of fault tolerance.
of the diagram is the equivalence relation S, which must hold for A and B. It expresses
that at some stage after the occurrence of F , the behaviour of the system is in some way
equal to the behaviour without the occurrence of the fault. This is the aforementioned
reference to the correct behaviour. Thus, in ASB, B is regarded as correct behaviour.
Based on these observations, a more precise definition of fault tolerance can be made:
A system A tolerates a fault F , iff any sequence of reactions →* , starting
from AF , leads to a state B, where there is a relation S such that ASB.
In some situations, for example if parts of a system are not critical, the restriction that
there are only internal transitions while the system evolves from AF to B may be relaxed.
That is, certain observable actions may be ignored while the system is recovering from a
fault. Then, the sequences of reactions −→* can be replaced by sequences of transitions
β−→* , where β ∈ NC ∪ τ . The set NC is the set of non-critical names, which must be
specified explicitly for this purpose as part of the fault assumption.
In the following sections, the consequences of choosing concrete relations for S, namely
strong (∼) and weak (≈) bisimulation, are investigated.
5.4.2 Fault Tolerance based on strong bisimilarity
What can be said about fault tolerance when taking strong bisimulation, i.e. S =∼, as
reference for correct behaviour? That is, at some point after a fault, the behaviour must
be strongly bisimilar to the nominal behaviour of the state before the fault.
Assuming A ∼ AF would not leave any room for the required sequence of reactions,
and would also imply that AF = B. Moreover, the fault transition itself does not seam to
make sense if A ∼ AF . Essentially, this would mean, that the fault had no effect at all.
All fault functions with the property that F(P ) ∼ P imply that A ∼ AF , and it may be
argued that they do not really model faults. Assuming a strong simulation R, such that
ARAF would leave room for reactions and even observable transitions. However, it does
not imply that finally a state of strong bisimilarity, i.e. B ∼ A, will be reached.
In summary, both cases are not very fruitful. If A ∼ AF , the fault did not really have
any effect, and ARAF does not guarantee that finally A ∼ B, as required. Obviously, a
less discriminating equivalence relation is necessary. Using weak bisimulation instead of
strong bisimulation would not help much, since A ≈ AF also does not imply that A ∼ B.
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However, if the latter relation is also weakened to ≈, it turns out to give a reasonable
definition of fault tolerance.
5.4.3 Fault Tolerance based on weak bisimilarity
In contrast to the previous section, now the assumptions are that A ≈ B and that there
is a sequence of reactions →* , such that AF →* B. It can be shown, that whenever the
nominal behaviour A is weakly bisimilar to the behaviour after the fault transition, AF ,
the diagram in figure 5.4 is consistent and one can speak of fault tolerance.
Proposition 5.4.1 If A ≈ B and AF →* B, then there exists a weak simulation S,
such that ASAF .
Proof: Proposition 5.4.1 is proved by constructing a weak simulation, assuming AF →
* B and A ≈ B. There are two cases according to the definition of weak simulation.
1. if A→ A′, there exists AF ′ , such that AF →* AF ′ and A′SAF ′ .
(a) Since weak simulation is a subset of weak bisimulation, there is a weak simula-
tion R, such that ARB. Hence, if there is A→ A′, then there is also B → B′
and A′RB′.
(b) Take AF
′
= B′ by observing that AF →* B → B′. Define the weak simulation
S = {〈A,AF〉} ∪ R. This concludes (1.).
2. if A
α−→ A′, there exists AF ′ , such that AF →* α−→ →* AF ′ and A′SAF ′ .
(a) Again, from A ≈ B follows that, there is a weak simulation R, such that ARB.
Hence, if there is A
α−→ A′, then there is also B α−→ B′ and A′RB′.
(b) Take AF
′
= B′ by observing that AF → * B α−→ B′. Define the weak
simulation S = {〈A,AF〉} ∪ R. This concludes (2.).

This result shows that there are AF , which can behave like A, while having the possibility
to have internal behaviour preceding a stateB, from which they show observable behaviour
weakly equivalent to A. However, AF →* B only asserts that there exists a sequence
of reactions leading to state B. It does not assert, that there is no sequence of reactions
leading to another state. This assumption is strong enough to show that AF has the
capability to behave like A, but it is not strong enough to guarantee it. In order to achieve
fault tolerance, it seems natural to demand that all sequences of reactions, starting from
AF , should lead into a state B which (observationally) behaves like A. This immediately
leads to the next proposition.
Proposition 5.4.2 ∀(AF →* B) : A ≈ B ⇒ A ≈ AF .
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Proof: The right-hand side of the above proposition is indeed another way to say that
AF ≈ A. The trivial case is where →* is the empty sequence, such that B = AF ,
and AF ≈ A is required. But if this holds, then all states reachable trough sequences of
reactions must also be weakly bisimilar to A, since all those sequences may be matched
by no reaction of A 
Proposition 5.4.2 tells that A ≈ AF , if the assumptions hold. If also the reversed im-
plication holds, it would be enough to check A and AF for weak bisimilarity in order to
conclude fault tolerance of A with respect to F .
Proposition 5.4.3 ∀(AF →* B) : A ≈ B ⇔ A ≈ AF .
Proof: Suppose there is C with AF →* C, A 6≈ C. It can be shown that this implies
A 6≈ AF , contradicting the premise. To be observably different from A, C must have the
capability of a transition C
λ−→ C ′, which A can not match. Because of AF →* C, there
exists a sequence of transitions AF →* λ−→ C ′, which can not be matched by A. Thus
AF 6≈ A. 
The results show that weak bisimilarity offers a useful and simple definition of fault
tolerance.
Definition 5.4.1 (F−tolerant) Let F be a fault function. The predicate F−tolerant :
Ps → {true, false} is defined as:
F−tolerant(P ) = P F−→ P ′ ⇒ P ′ ≈ P(5.53)
Thus, checking whether the process expression after a fault transition is weakly bisimilar
to the expression before yields an answer to the question whether the system is fault
tolerant. This also makes sense at an intuitive level, since fault tolerance intuitively
means unaffected observable behaviour. Since this requirement may be too strong in some
situations, it could be relaxed such that the observable behaviour may deviate from the
expected, but only while the system is recovering. After a finite number of transitions, the
system finally must behave as expected. With these requirements, the relation between
the behaviours before and after a fault, A and AF , can not be covered by weak bisimulation
anymore. The next section provides a generalisation of the definition of fault-tolerance,
which allows for more flexibility.
5.4.4 Generalisation
In the previous sections, is was assumed that AF →* B, where B has the same behaviour
as A according to some equivalence relation. Moreover, it was assumed this holds for
any →* . These assumptions are valid, given that A ≈ AF and some B ≈ A. However,
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for arbitrary sequences of transitions AF α−→* B and a general relation S, BSA it is
not guaranteed by AFSA. The definitions in this section provide a generalisation for
definitions of fault tolerance, which are not restricted to the use of weak bisimulation as
in section 5.4.3.
Definition 5.4.2 (possibly-S) Let R be a binary relation over Ps. Then R is said to
be an possibly-S relation if, whenever PRQ, one of the two following propositions hold:
1. P S Q,
2. there exists α with P α→ P ′, such that P ′RQ.
It is said that possibly PSQ if there exists an possibly-S relation R, such that PRQ.
The relation P possibly−S Q expresses the fact that there is a sequence of transitions from
P to a state P ′, such that finally P ′SQ. Note that PSQ may or may not hold in the first
place. Figure 5.5 illustrates a path leading to P nSQ, while other branches exist, which
may not lead to some PmSQ.
¬(PSQ) ¬(P 1SQ) ¬(P iSQ) (P nSQ)
P 1P nP... QS
α α α
Figure 5.5: Illustration of possibly-S.
Definition 5.4.3 (S-convergence) Let R be a binary relation over Ps. Then R is said
to be a S-convergence if, whenever PRQ, one of the two following propositions hold
1. P S Q,
2. for all P α→ P ′ : P ′RQ
If there is a S-convergence R with PRQ, then it is said that P converges to Q up to S,
written P S Q.
In contrast to possibly−S, the relation S−convergence requires that all sequences of
transitions lead to a state, where finally P ′SQ. Figure 5.6 indicates that all paths starting
in P lead to some P nSQ.
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P 1P nP... QS
... Po S Q
... Pm S Q
α
α
α
α
α α
α
α α
α
α
Figure 5.6: Illustration of S-convergence.
Example 5.4.1 Here is a simple example illustrating possibly-S and S-convergence.
Consider any prefixed process α.P and strong bisimulation. The prefixed process is not
bisimilar to its continuation, i.e. α.P 6∼ P . But after the transition α.P α−→ P , P ∼ P
does hold. That is, property 2 of definition 5.4.2 is satisfied, such that α.P possibly− ∼ P .
The same applies for property 2 of definition 5.4.3, such that α.P converges to P up to
∼. Of course, this example is not very interesting, since it can be easily seen that α.P
reduces to P in one step, such that any reflexive relation would hold. 
5.4.5 Relation to Temporal Logic and Model Checking
In this section, it will be shown how the relations possibly−S and S−convergence may
be characterised by temporal logic formulae, and how model checking may be used to
determine these relations.
In propositional calculus, a formula becomes a proposition, if all propositional vari-
ables are replaced by propositions. That is, if the variables are assigned a truth value,
representing the ”current state of affairs”, or ”how things actually are”. As a result, the
formula is either true or false, depending on the assignment of truth values to the variables.
Determining the truth value of propositional calculus formulae involves a consideration
of exactly one concrete such assignment. It does not play any role how things might be
otherwise for the truth value of the formula with respect to how things actually are. This
is different in propositional modal logic, which results from extending propositional logic
by the necessity operator. When trying to determine the truth value of a modal logic
formula, it is not in general sufficient to consider only the current state of affairs, as the
outcome may depend on other other states of affairs which are considered to be possible.
This is because of the nature of necessity, which is represented in that a given formula f
is said to be necessarily true, written Lf , iff it is true for all conceivable states of affairs.
Thereby, not just any assignment of truth values to the propositional variables is possible.
Which ones are possible is usually modelled as a set W of worlds, together with a dyadic
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relation R over W , specifying which world is possible, or accessible, relative to another
world. Therefore, R is sometimes called accessibility relation. The pair 〈W,R〉 is called
a frame and is easily pictured as a directed graph. Additionally, there is a valuation
function L, which assigns truth values to variables for each world. The triple 〈W,R,L〉 is
called a model. For a comprehensive introduction to modal logic the reader is referred to
Hughes&Cresswell [43].
In temporal logic, the accessibility function is interpreted as marking successive mo-
ments in time, where the values of the propositional variables can change from moment to
moment. Thereby, in contrast to the actual advancement of time, only the causal order
of moments is important. Imagine the state of a program given by a set of variables,
which is modified by operations. There is a state before an operation and a different state
after this operation. Since operations modify the state upon which they are executed,
propositions about it may change their value while going from one state to another. This
is precisely mimicked by the temporal interpretation of R.
Putting things together, one can define a model for temporal logic, usually a Kripke
Structure, based on the states and transitions of the LTS inferred from a process ex-
pression. A Kripke Structure M over a set of propositional variables AP (for atomic
propositions) is a tuple 〈W0,W,R, L〉, where
• W is a finite set of states,
• W0 ⊆ W is a set of initial states,
• R ⊆ W ×W is a total transition relation,
• and L : W → P(AP) is a valuation function defining which propositions are true in
which state.
Let MP be a Kripke Structure derived from the LTS of a process expression P as follows:
• W0 = {P},
• W is the set of all states in the LTS of P ,
• and R are the transitions of the LTS of P .
Furthermore, the set of atomic propositions AP has only one member p, which says as
much as: ”The current state is in relation S with Q.”, which formally reads PSQ. Thereby,
S and Q are as in the definition of possibly−S and S−convergence above. The valuation
function L, which assigns a truth value for p for every state P ′ of MP is literally given by
the proposition p itself, i.e. L(P ′) = 〈p, P ′SQ〉.
So far, MP is the model to be checked. The next ingredient is the definition against
what, i.e. the temporal logic formulae characterising the relations possibly−S as well as
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S−convergence. Most model checking tools use either PLTL (Propositional Linear Tem-
poral Logic) [73, 74] or CTL (Computation Tree Logic) [22, 23]. The relations in question
will be characterised by CTL formulae, as CTL provides the possibility to quantify over
different execution paths, which might branch off at the current or some future state.
This is supported by the path quantifiers A and E, which do not exist in PLTL. Thus, the
model checking problem defined below could not be solved using SPIN [41], as this model
checker requires PLTL property specifications. A choice could be SMV [62], which accepts
properties expressed in CTL [7]. However, as mentioned at the end of this section, it is not
likely that existing model checkers will be able to solve the problem without modification.
The following two CTL formulae characterise the above relations as follows:
possibly−S : fposs = EFp(5.54)
and
S−convergence : fconv = AFp,(5.55)
where p is the atomic proposition mentioned earlier. In CTL, the term Fp announces that
”in some future state p will hold”. Thus, possibly−S is formulated as: ”There exists a path
(E), where in some future state p holds (Fp).”. This closely corresponds to the scenario
depicted in figure 5.5. Conversely, S−convergence is formulated as: ”For all paths (A) it
is true, that in some future state p holds (Fp).”, which can be compared to figure 5.6.
Finally, the determination of the relations can be expressed as model checking prob-
lems. Given a Kripke Structure M = 〈W0,W,R, L〉, the model checking problem is to
find the set of all states in W , which satisfy a given temporal logic formula f :
{w ∈ W |M,w  f}.(5.56)
If this set contains the set of initial states W0, the model satisfies the property specified
by f [21]. Hence, the relations correspond to:
P possibly−S Q ⇔ W0 ⊆ {w ∈ W |MP , w  fposs}(5.57)
and
P S−convergence Q ⇔ W0 ⊆ {w ∈ W |MP , w  fconv}.(5.58)
To this end, it was shown that the membership of a pair of processes in one of the two
presented relations may be determined using model checking, provided that the model
checker has the capability of evaluating propositions like p. For example, if the relation S
on which possibly and convergence are defined, is bisimulation, evaluating p amounts to
checking process expressions for observational equivalence. Unfortunately, this is unlikely
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to work with any model checker out of the box, such that modifications must be made
first. However, the modification would only regard the valuation function, not the model
checking approach itself. With the definition in the next section, fault tolerance properties
of systems may be determined by model checking techniques.
5.4.6 Generalised Definition of Fault Tolerance
Next, the previous definition of fault tolerance in 5.4.1 is generalised using the concept of
convergence.
Definition 5.4.4 (S − F−tolerant) Let S be an equivalence relation over Ps and F be
a fault function. The predicate S − F−tolerant : Ps → {true, false} is defined as:
S − F−tolerant(P ) = P F−→ P ′ ⇒ P ′ S P(5.59)
With this generalisation of fault tolerance, figure 5.4 can be modified, such that arbitrary
transitions instead of only reactions are allowed after a fault. The result is shown in
figure 5.7. When allowing arbitrary transitions after a fault, the effects of it can be
AF
F−→ α
−→
A S B
Figure 5.7: Generalised scenario of fault tolerance.
observed by the environment, such that this kind of fault tolerance is not restricted to
fault masking. It depends on the application and on the environment, whether and which
observable actions may occur because of a fault, until the convergence is finished. A
suitable way of restricting these actions as part of the convergence relation can be defined
for this purpose, but this is beyond the scope here.
Since it is desired that the system after the fault should behave equal to the system
before the fault in some sense, S is naturally restricted to be an equivalence relation.
In most cases, it should be appropriate to choose observational equivalence, i.e. S =≈.
When using S =≈ and restricting the transitions during the convergence to reactions,
S − F−tolerant coincides with F−tolerant . Moreover, the following holds:
∀P ∈ Ps : F−tolerant(P ) ⇒ ≈−F−tolerant(P ).(5.60)
The fault tolerance definitions provided so far consider a specific state only. Given
some system [P ]C , it is necessary to determine whether S − F−tolerant(P ′) for all P ′ in
the transitive closure of [P ]C under transitions and for all F in the union of all local fault
assumptions, in order to conclude fault tolerance of the overall system.
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5.5 Summary
In this chapter, the basic framework underlying the analysis of the behaviour of a sys-
tem under faults was developed. Roughly speaking, this framework, called fault calculus,
consists of an extension to the behaviour description formalism introduced in chapter 2.
The syntax of the latter was supplemented with a new primitive, called a Partition. Its
primary purpose is the encapsulation of parts of a process expression as a named entity.
In the next step, the semantics were defined by a set of inference rules, which precisely
discriminate nominal from faulty behaviour. Thereby, the Fault rules give rise to fault
transitions, whenever a corresponding fault assumption holds. The fault assumption spec-
ifies which faults are assumes to occur potentially for a certain partition. It was therefore
modelled as a function mapping sets of fault models to partitions. Subsequently, the
fault models themselves were defined. Each fault model describes the direct change, or
damage, of the nominal behaviour of a partition, which is caused by the modelled fault.
Fault models are therefore conceived as transformation functions over process expres-
sions. Transformations for important system level fault models were given. Furthermore,
additional classes of fault models — value and partial – were proposed along with corre-
sponding transformation functions. Finally, a suitable encoding of the component-based
system model was given. Using this structured component encoding, fault calculus can be
applied to any system model as in chapter 2.
The formal definitions of fault transitions and faulty behaviour in this chapter facilitate
a precise treatment of fault tolerance. First, a general scenario of fault tolerance was
outlined. In this scenario, any path of execution after a fault transition must lead silently,
i.e. by reactions, into states which yield behaviour equivalent to the nominal behaviour
of the state just before the fault occurred. A corresponding definition was attempted
using strong and weak bisimulation as the measure of behavioural equivalence. It turned
out, that weak bisimulation provides the basis for a suitable formal definition of fault
tolerance, determined by the predicate F−tolerance. In some situations it might not be
feasible to consider only reactions during the recovery after a fault transition and weak
bisimulation as equivalence relation. Therefore, the proposed notion of fault tolerance
was generalised. The resulting general definition, S − F−tolerance, is based on a general
equivalence relation S, and a convergence criteria captured by the S−convergence relation
over process expressions. The latter ensures that finally a state of S-equivalence is reached
after a fault transition. Furthermore it was pointed out, that F−tolerance is a special
case of S − F−tolerance.
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Chapter 6
Extended Example
In order to illustrate the application of the fault model and the proposed notion of fault
tolerance, an extended example is investigated next. The fault model is applied to an
architectural principle, which is known as Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). While this
principle does not make a system fail-safe in general, it does provide tolerance for certain
fault assumptions. It is shown, how such assumptions are applied to the system, how
the system behaviour under these assumptions is derived and how the result interpreted
with respect to the definition of fault tolerance in the previous chapter. First, a simple
system performing a computation is analysed under the assumption that no fault occurs
as well as under the assumption that the value produced at the output may be corrupted.
Then, three instances of the same system are used as redundant components of a larger
system, based on the TMR principle. Again, the same fault assumptions are applied to the
redundant components and the resulting behaviour is derived. The type of fault assumed
in the example is masked, as verified by concluding fault tolerance for this specific fault
assumption.
6.1 Nominal Behaviour
The object of study is a component, whose purpose is some computation. Therefore, the
component repeatedly reads input values, internally computes a result and writes it to
the output. Figure 6.1 shows the component.
Compute
(P)
i o
Figure 6.1: A component carrying out a computation.
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The structural encoding of the above component along with the definition of its be-
haviour P is defined as
[P ]Compute where P = new r : ˆ?
(
r | ! r.i (x) .o 〈f(x)〉.r︸ ︷︷ ︸
PR
)
(6.1)
In equation 6.1, PR denotes the replicated part of the expression, which will be used as an
abbreviation in subsequent expressions. Next, the nominal behaviour of this component
is shown. The first two nominal transitions, derived via Nom1, are one reaction involving
the internal link r, and a subsequent input action i (x):
[P ]Compute
τr,i(x)−−−→
[
new r : ˆ?
(
!PR | o 〈f(x)〉r
)]
Compute
(6.2)
After reading at i, Compute is ready to send the result at o. According to the transition
rules for nominal behaviour, the following expression results:[
new r : ˆ?
(
!PR | o 〈f(x)〉.r
)]
Compute
o 〈f(x)〉−−−−→
[
new r : ˆ?
(
!PR | r
)]
Compute
.(6.3)
Thereafter, the initial state is reached again, such that the transitions derived until now
can repeat forever, producing the infinite sequence ”τr −→ i (x) −→ o 〈f(x)〉 −→ τr −→
. . .”. This can be drawn as an LTS, which is shown in figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: LTS showing the nominal behaviour of Compute.
The computation, which is symbolically represented by f(x), can be of arbitrary com-
plexity. Because of this, it is likely that some unexpected fault may corrupt the result of
the computation. While the fault source itself is unknown and therefore not modelled,
the possible impact of it — corruption of the result of Compute — can be modelled with
fault calculus.
6.2 Faulty behaviour
In the example at hand, the send corruption fault model shall be assumed for Compute,
i.e. lfa(Compute) = {FSC}. As a consequence, the output of the component may not be
equal to f(x) as expected. When Compute is ready to send the result via o as in (6.3),
it turns out, that the premise of the FaultOpen rule is satisfied. Taking [P ]D
λ−→ [P ′]D
to be the transition in (6.3), a fault transition
F−→ for every F ∈ lfa(Compute) can be
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inferred. Since lfa(Compute) contains only one element, one fault transition results from
the application of FaultOpen:
[new r : ˆ? (!PR | o 〈f(x)〉.r)]Compute o 〈f(x)〉−−−−→ [new r : ˆ? (!PR | r)]Compute
[new r:ˆ ? (!PR | o 〈f(x)〉.r)]Compute FSC−−→ [FSC(new r:ˆ ? (!PR | o 〈f(x)〉.r))]Compute
.(6.4)
In order to obtain the resulting process expression, the transformation according to def-
inition 5.3.12, which is the fault model for send corruption FSC , must be applied. This
process is exercised next by traversing the syntax tree of the expression in a top-down
manner, applying the transformation to each node recursively as defined. Starting at the
root, which is a Restriction, equation (5.21) must be used first:[
new r : ˆ? (!PR | o 〈f(x)〉.r)
]
FSC
= new r : ˆ?
(
[[!PR | o 〈f(x)〉.r]]FSC
)
.(6.5)
Next, FSC must be applied to !PR | o 〈f(x)〉.r, which is a parallel composition. According
to (5.19): [
!PR | o 〈f(x)〉.r
]
FSC
=
[
!PR
]
FSC
|
[
o 〈f(x)〉.r
]
FSC
.(6.6)
Applying FSC to the replication on the left hand side of the composition operator above
according to (5.22) results in:[
!PR
]
FSC
=
[
PR
]
FSC
| !PR.(6.7)
The next application of FSC to PR = r.i (x) .o 〈f(x)〉.r terminates this branch of the
transformation. Using (5.17) since this is a receive prefix and writing Q instead of
i (x) .o 〈f(x)〉.r for brevity yields:[
r.Q
]
FSC
=
[
r.Q
]
I
= r.Q = PR.(6.8)
Substituting this result in (6.7) shows that in this case FSC is also the identity function
for !PR: [
!PR
]
FSC
= PR | !PR ≡ !PR.(6.9)
Next, there is a pending application of FSC to the expression on the right hand side of
the composition operator in (6.6), o 〈f(x)〉.r. By (5.43), and this is the crucial point of
the send corruption fault model:[
o 〈f(x)〉.r
]
FSC
= o 〈Undefd〉.r.(6.10)
This terminates the rest of the transformation. Substituting the intermediate results
of (6.9) and (6.10) in (6.6) yields:[
!PR | o 〈f(x)〉.r
]
FSC
= !PR | o 〈Undefd〉.r.(6.11)
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Substituting this once more in (6.5) the final result is obtained as[
new r : ˆ? (!PR | o 〈f(x)〉.r)
]
FSC
= new r : ˆ?
(
!PR | o 〈Undefd〉.r
)
.(6.12)
To this end, the derived fault transition can be written as
[new r:ˆ ? (!PR | o 〈f(x)〉.r)]Compute FSC−−→ [new r:ˆ ? (!PR | o 〈Undefd〉.r)]Compute .(6.13)
As a consequence of assuming send corruption for Compute, reading the output of the
component may yield undefined values, possibly not equal to f(x). Thus, the behaviour
of Compute is not given by the infinite sequence ”τr −→ i (x) −→ o 〈f(x)〉 −→ τr −→ . . .”
anymore. The behaviour under faults is illustrated in figure 6.2. As opposed to the infinite
sequence of transitions before, now the transitions span an infinite tree, where after each
input transition i (x), there is a choice between the nominal output transition o 〈f(x)〉
and a fault transition FSC followed by a faulty output transition o 〈Undefd〉, because
of the send corruption assumption. By comparing the LTS for nominal behaviour to the
Figure 6.3: LTS of Compute under send corruption.
LTS for the behaviour under faults, the strict enlarging nature of fault calculus can be
observed. As ensured by theorem 5.2.1, the nominal behaviour is completely contained
within the faulty behaviour.
6.3 Fault Tolerance
It can be seen, that false results can be received from the Compute component when
assuming send corruption faults to occur. In critical applications, this could have fatal
consequences. Next it is shown, how TMR may be used to mask the faulty behaviour such
that even under the fault assumption of send corruption for Compute, only the desired
nominal behaviour executed and observable by the environment. In TMR, basically three
copies of the Compute component are used to carry out the computation simultaneously.
A comparator compares the three results and prevents wrong results to be forwarded
to the output. With this setup, single fault occurrences can be corrected, i.e. masked,
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while double faults can still be detected. The latter possibility is not considered here,
instead the focus is on the corrective capabilities. Figure 6.3 shows the component with
the redundant sub-components. The structured process expression for component C is
o1
o2
o3
i1
i2
i3
liA
liB
liC
loB
loC
loA
oi
C
(P)
(P)
CompareDisp
(P)
C
(Q) (R)
i
i
i o
o
o
i o
Compute
Compute
Compute
B
A
Figure 6.4: A component using redundant sub-components for the computation.
given by
[P ′]C
def
=
[
new
γ︷ ︸︸ ︷
liA, liB, liC , loA, loB, loC : ?ˆ
(
{liA,liB ,liC/o1,o2,o3}[Q]Disp |(6.14)
{liA,loA/i,o}[P ]ComputeA |
{liB ,loB/i,o}[P ]ComputeB |
{liC ,loC/i,o}[P ]ComputeC |
{lo{A,B,C}/i{1,2,3}}[R]Compare
)]
C
The sub-components are a dispatcher (Disp), the copies of the computation components
(ComputeX ) and a comparator (Compare). Their behaviour is defined by the process
expressions Q, P and R respectively. While P is already defined in (6.1) above, Q and R
are given by
Q
def
= new r : ˆ?
(
r | !r.i (x) .o1 〈x〉.o2 〈x〉.o3 〈x〉.r
)
(6.15)
R
def
= new r : ˆ?
(
r | !r.i1 (x) .i2 (y) .i3 (z) .(6.16)
[x = y]?o 〈x〉.r :
[y = z]?o 〈y〉.r :
[z = x]?o 〈z〉.r : 0
)
The nominal behaviour of component C is equal to that of a single instance of Compute
alone. More precisely, there exists a weak bisimulation between Compute and C, i.e.
[P ′]C ≈ [P ]Compute . The following derivation of nominal behaviour of C indicates equal
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behaviour compared to Compute. Starting with P ′, there is a first reaction of [Q]Disp on
its internal link r. After substituting names in Q according to (6.15), there is:
[new r : ?ˆ (r | !
QR︷ ︸︸ ︷
r.i (x) .liA 〈x〉.liB 〈x〉.liC 〈x〉.r)]Disp τr−→(6.17)
[new r : ˆ? (r | !QR | i (x) .liA 〈x〉.liB 〈x〉.liC 〈x〉.r)]Disp
A similar reaction is performed by each Compute component, before it is ready to receive
its input as shown in (6.2). These reactions also lead to τr transitions, but are they are
omitted for simplicity. Now, Q can engage itself in an input action i (x), followed by
output actions at liA, liB and liC , which dispatch the received value to the redundant
Compute components. Since the components are waiting for their input at the mentioned
links, three reactions result. Then the components concurrently compute the result and
send it via the assigned links loA, loB and loC . The Compare component waits for the
results at precisely these links, producing another three reactions within C. Using li{A,B,C}
is an abbreviation of liA, liB, liC :
[P ′]C
τr,i,τli{A,B,C}−−−−−−−−→
[
new γ
(
[Q′]Disp | [!{liA,loA/i,o}PR | loA 〈f(x)〉.r]ComputeA |(6.18)
[!{liB ,loB/i,o}PR | loB 〈f(x)〉.r]ComputeB |
[!{liC ,loC/i,o}PR | loC 〈f(x)〉.r]ComputeC |
{lo{A,B,C}/i{1,2,3}}[R]Compare
]
C
τlo{A,B,C}−−−−−−→
[
new γ
(
[Q′]Disp | [!{liA,loA/i,o}PR | r]ComputeA |(6.19)
[!{liB ,loB/i,o}PR | r]ComputeB |
[!{liC ,loC/i,o}PR | r]ComputeC |
[R′]Compare
]
C
,
where
R′ =new r : ˆ?
(
!{lo{A,B,C}/i{1,2,3}}RR |(6.20)
[f(x) = f(x)]?o 〈f(x)〉.r :
[f(x) = f(x)]?o 〈f(x)〉.r :
[f(x) = f(x)]?o 〈f(x)〉.r : 0
)
Note, that all these transitions except for the input at i are internal to the compo-
nent C and not observable by the environment. Meanwhile the components Disp and
Compute{A,B,C} can go in their initial state by individually performing another reaction
at the internal r links. The next important actions are to be taken by R′ now. By the
transitions
lo{A,B,C}−−−−−→ , the names x,y and z were all replaced by f(x) in R′. This can
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be interpreted as R having received the ”correct” results from the redundant components,
which corresponds to the desired nominal behaviour. Consequently, all conditions R′
have the form [f(x) = f(x)]. Since f(x) = f(x) always holds, the only way to proceed
from (6.20) is taking the true branch of the condition, o 〈f(x)〉.r. Applying CondTrue
yields:
R′ τ−→ new r : ˆ?
(
!{lo{A,B,C}/i{1,2,3}}RR | o 〈f(x)〉.r
)
, GC = GC ∧ true(6.21)
Assuming the global constraint can be satisfied before, it is possible to satisfy it after the
transition. In contrast, the application of CondFalse leads to a global constraint which
can not be satisfied. Therefore, the transition above is the only possible transition in this
state. To this end, the nominal behaviour of C is given by the sequence ”
τr−→ , i(x)−−→ ,
τli{A,B,C}−−−−−−→ ,
τlo{A,B,C}−−−−−−→ , τ−→ , o 〈f(x)〉−−−−→ , τr−→ , . . .”. Just as in the case of nominal behaviour
of Compute before, the corresponding LTS has a simple circular structure. Since, the only
two observable actions in the cycle are i (x) and o 〈f(x)〉, the components C and Compute
have bisimilar nominal behaviour.
Figure 6.5: Nominal behaviour of C.
In order to compare the faulty behaviour and to see the effect of TMR, the same
fault assumption, this time for all three instances of the Compute component, are made.
By taking lfa(Compute{A,B ,C}) = {FSC}, send corruption faults are possible for each
of Compute{A,B ,C}. Starting again from [P ′]C as in (6.18), there are the tree nominal
transitions
τr−→ , i(x)−−→ , and τliA−−→ . Right after the last of those, ComputeA is ready
to send at its output link loA, while ComputeB and ComputeC are still waiting for their
input:
[P ′]C
τr,i,τliA−−−−→
[
new γ
(
[Q′]Disp | [!{liA,loA/i,o}PR | loA 〈f(x)〉.r]ComputeA |(6.22)
[!{liB ,loB/i,o}PR | liB (x) .loB 〈f(x)〉.r]ComputeB |
[!{liC ,loC/i,o}PR | liC (x) .loC 〈f(x)〉.r]ComputeC |
{lo{A,B,C}/i{1,2,3}}[R]Compare
]
C
(6.23)
This constitutes a situation, where FaultClosed may be applied. As required by this rule,
there must be a partition with the capability to engage in some non-internal transition
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λ. Furthermore, there must be a context, in which this partition can interact with its
environment using the same transition λ. Transferring this to the situation in (6.22),
ComputeA provides the partition with the transition
loA 〈f(x)〉−−−−−→ and the top-level com-
ponent C provides the context in which Compare can interact with ComputeA at this
link, yielding a transition
τloA−−→ , which is internal to the context. Consequently, a fault
transition can be inferred, where ComputeA is transformed in the same way as Compute
before. The result is then substituted within the context C:
FSC(ComputeA)−−−−−−−−−→
[
new γ
(
[Q′]Disp | [!{liA,loA/i,o}PR | loA 〈Undefd〉.r]ComputeA |(6.24)
[!{liB ,loB/i,o}PR | liB (x) .loB 〈f(x)〉.r]ComputeB |
[!{liC ,loC/i,o}PR | liC (x) .loC 〈f(x)〉.r]ComputeC |
{lo{A,B,C}/i{1,2,3}}[R]Compare
]
C
(6.25)
As before, the output action loA 〈f(x)〉 is replaced by loA 〈Undefd〉. The next transitions
are the remaining interactions at liB and liC , followed by the interactions at lo{A,B,C}.
Note, that because of the fault transition, an undefined value is exchanged in the tran-
sition
τloA−−→ . This transition between ComputeA and Compare arises as follows. Using
unpartition([P ′]C) for simplicity and omitting the irrelevant parts of the remaining ex-
pression yields
loA 〈Undefd〉.r | loA (x) .loB (y) . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
={lo{A,B,C}/i{1,2,3}}R
(6.26)
as the origin of the interaction at loA. By Inp and Comm:
τloA−−→ r |{Undefd/x}(loA (x) .loB (y) . . .)(6.27)
≡ r |{x′/x}(loA (x) .loB (y) . . .) by 4.2.5(6.28)
This indicates, that because of
τloA−−→ , x′ must be substituted for x in [R′]Compare . The
result can be seen in (6.31) below:
τli{B,C}−−−−→
[
new γ
(
[Q′]Disp | [!{liA,loA/i,o}PR | loA 〈Undefd〉.r]ComputeA |(6.29)
[!{liB ,loB/i,o}PR | loB 〈f(x)〉.r]ComputeB |
[!{liC ,loC/i,o}PR | loC 〈f(x)〉.r]ComputeC |
{lo{A,B,C}/i{1,2,3}}[R]Compare
]
C
τlo{A,B,C}−−−−−−→
[
new γ
(
[Q′]Disp | [!{liA,loA/i,o}PR | r]ComputeA |(6.30)
[!{liB ,loB/i,o}PR | r]ComputeB |
[!{liC ,loC/i,o}PR | r]ComputeC |
[R′]Compare
]
C
,
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where
R′ =new r : ˆ?
(
!{lo{A,B,C}/i{1,2,3}}RR |(6.31)
[x′ = f(x)]?o 〈x′〉.r :
[f(x) = f(x)]?o 〈f(x)〉.r :
[f(x) = x′]?o 〈f(x)〉.r : 0
)
By the semantics of values introduced in section 4.2.1, x′ is interpreted as undefined
in [R′]Compare ! Thus, it is unknown whether x′ = f(x), such that both CondTrue and
CondFalse must be applied. In contrast, the nominal behaviour in (6.20) allowed only
the inference with CondTrue . It is due to the faulty behaviour that both cases must be
considered now.
Case 1: The undefined value x′ equals f(x), and is therefore sent at o. Applying the
CondTrue rule to (6.31) yields:
R′
τTrue−−−→ new r : ˆ?
(
!{lo{A,B,C}/i{1,2,3}}RR | o 〈x′〉.r
)
, GC = GC ∧ x′ = f(x).
(6.32)
Thus, the global constraint GC assures that, whenever this point is reached, the value
sent via o will actually be f(x), as desired.
Case 2: The undefined value differs from f(x), corresponding to the application of the
CondFalse rule:
R′
τFalse−−−→ new r : ˆ?
(
!{lo{A,B,C}/i{1,2,3}}RR |(6.33)
[f(x) = f(x)]?o 〈f(x)〉.r :
[f(x) = x′]?o 〈f(x)〉.r : 0, GC = GC ∧ x′ 6= f(x).(6.34)
Taking the false branch of the condition leads to the next condition [f(x) = f(x)],
which always holds. After another application of CondTrue, the desired value f(x) is
sent via o, like in the first case. The remaining reaction on the internal link r reenters
the initial state {lo{A,B,C}/i{1,2,3}}[R]Compare , and together with similar reactions within the
other components the whole component C goes back into its initial state [P ′]Compute .
This can also be illustrated by a drawing the corresponding LTS , as shown in fig-
ure 6.6. All grey shaded states belong to the faulty behaviour. In the transitions fol-
lowing the fault transitions, it is indicated by Undefd 0, where a corrupted computa-
tion result it exchanged with the Compare component. As can be seen, all paths lead
back to nominal behaviour without performing observable actions. This is the reason
why the environment surrounding C can not see the faults which occurred internally.
The faults were masked by the TMR design, which can be called fault tolerant in this
sense. According to the definition of fault tolerance in section 5.4, it is necessary to
show FSC − tolerance for the three states with fault transitions in figure 6.6, in order to
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Figure 6.6: Nominal and faulty behaviour of C.
proof the fault tolerance of component C. This is easily verified... Thus, assuming that
lfa(Disp) = lfa(Compare) = lfa(C) = ∅, plus the fault assumption of send corruption
for the redundant components, i.e. lfa(Compute{A,B ,C}) = {FSC}, component C is fault
tolerant. Note that changing the fault assumption may lead to a different result. For
example, assuming lfa(Compute{A,B ,C}) = {FCrash}, C turns out not to be fault toler-
ant. The reason is, that the Compare component waits for a result of all computation
components. If one of them crashes, no result will be sent and Compare waits forever.
Nevertheless, this scenario can be adopted using timeouts to achieve fault tolerance for
the stronger fault assumption.
6.4 Summary
This chapter illustrated the application of fault calculus in a concrete example. The design
technique of triple modular redundancy, which is used to achieve fault tolerance, was
analysed with the methods introduced in this work. Therefore, a component carrying out
some computation was described, and its nominal behaviour was derived. The subsequent
revision of the same component in the light of fault calculus and a fault assumption
demonstrated how the faulty behaviour can be derived. Next, another component was
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shown to obey equivalent nominal behaviour, while carrying out the computation in a
redundant fashion. Again, this component was revisited in fault calculus and the same
fault assumption. As expected, the model confirmed the fault masking capabilities of
triple modular redundancy, and fault tolerance was formally concluded.
104 6. EXTENDED EXAMPLE
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Outlook
7.1 Results
In this work, a formal fault model was introduced. Its main contributions can be divided
into the three interdependent fields fault calculus, the fault model itself, and the meaning
of fault tolerance in this context. The calculus used as basic representation for system
behaviour was extended to contain structural information of the modelled system. Struc-
ture is represented by so called Partitions - terms that were introduced into the syntax
for this purpose. Using Partitions, an additional transition rule called Fault defines
under which conditions a fault, or better the model of it, unfold its effects. The resulting
fault transitions represent the faulty behaviour of a system. All other transitions represent
nominal behaviour. Given any system model in terms of the basic representation, there
are fault calculus expressions called partitionings. These basically represent the same sys-
tem, but with structural information. An important fact about partitionings is that they
are behaviourally enlarging their corresponding basic expressions. Moreover, all of them
have the same nominal behaviour.
Fault calculus relies on the second field of the contributions, the fault model. More
precisely, faults are modelled as fault functions - transformations of process expressions.
Definitions of a number of fault functions that represent commonly used faults in system
fault modelling were given. Furthermore, some new fault models that allow a more precise
formulation of fault assumptions were presented. A specification of the faults that are
assumed to be possible for a given system is called fault assumption. It was formalised as
mapping from partitions to sets of fault functions. To this end, a system model comprises
a structured behavioural model and a fault assumption. Together with fault calculus,
the behaviour of systems in the presence of faults can be analysed or simulated. Since
precise operational semantics was presented, the approach is applicable to model checking
techniques.
Finally, a formal account to fault tolerance was developed. It is based on the idea, that
after a fault transition, the faulty system must converge back to its original behaviour.
This definition crucially depends on the equivalence relation that is used to determine
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when the convergence is completed. It was suggested to use weak bisimulation for this
purpose. However, it is possible to use other process equivalences. An example would be
a form of equivalence, customised to account for functional degradation.
A further result to be mentioned is the tool prototype, which was developed while
working on this thesis. Many of the presented concepts were implemented and evaluated
on this prototype. Figure 7.1 shows a screen-shot of the tool, viewing the basic represen-
tation (in SDL-like graphical notation) of the Compute component from the example in
the previous chapter.
Figure 7.1: Tool prototype.
7.2 Limitations and Open Issues
The complete analysis of a system may not be practicable, depending on the structure
and complexity of the system as well as on the fault assumptions applied to it. However,
a ”bottom-up” analysis should be applicable for critical parts of a system. That is, fault
tolerance of sub-systems can be analysed (e.g. communication component wrt. general
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omission), and treated as given in the analysis of a more complex system. This way, the
overall complexity of the fault analysis problem depends only on the complexity of the
system description at the current level considered in the analysis.
In principle, the fault models cover all faults. This is due to the transitive relation
between the models. For example. the Byzantine fault model causes ”arbitrary”behaviour
after a fault transition. This includes all the possible behaviour which would be caused
by assuming, say Send Omission. It is not the case that specific fault effects can not
be considered. The problem is the introduced complexity. When assuming Byzantine
faults for a component, the corresponding fault transition leads to a new state, where the
component’s behaviour is given by 5.3.7. From this state, many transitions can be derived,
depending on the number of interaction points (i.e. free names) of the component. That
means, the resulting LTS has many branches. Even worse, the number of branches does
not decline in the subsequent states. It is unlikely that the resulting LTS is analysable.
However, the path of execution caused by a more specific fault is certainly part of this
LTS. Unfortunately, this specific fault escapes any attempt to be analysed. To do so, a
more specific fault model must be created, which provides only the ”interesting” paths.
For example, some interesting fault models could be a variation of the corruption fault
models. Modifying a sent or received Boolean value to constantly true or false would
essentially describe a stuck-at fault model, as used in defect simulation in logic circuits.
An issue left open in this work is the modelling of timing faults. In real-time systems,
the correctness of behaviour also depends on time. If actions expected at specific times
occur at different times, like missing a deadline to deliver a result, this constitutes a
failure. On the other hand, a composed system might depend on its components to deliver
output or accept input in time in order to fulfil its purpose. In this case, a component
which does not act in time as expected poses a timing fault to the system. For example,
using the proposed time extension for pi-calculus, timing faults may be represented as
transformations of the time guards of a timed process expression. However, it is not
yet clear how to specify such faults for the observable behaviour of a component, as
the corresponding observable actions might not be directly guarded by an explicit time
interval. This indicates promising opportunities for future research.
Another open issue is the integration of probabilistic fault assumptions. Such assump-
tions regard the probability of occurrence of faults, such that they are related to the global
fault assumption. There are situations where faults only have an impact on the behaviour
of a system, if they occur frequently enough. While a system might be designed to toler-
ate the occurrence of a specific fault, it might not he capable of tolerating many of these
faults in short time, due to the computational overhead of the fault tolerance mechanism.
This also suggests interesting future research activities.
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In the remainder, possible applications of the presented work are pointed out. While
some of them are readily applicable, there is further potential and necessity for future
research.
7.3 Fault injection and simulation
A basic application of the fault model and the calculus is the simulation of faulty be-
haviour, driven by the explicit injection of faults at some point in the simulation. Because
of the operational semantics of the formalism, a partitioned system model can be readily
simulated. A fault may be injected by specifying the affected partition(s) and the fault(s)
to be considered. Then, the semantics of fault calculus implies some fault transitions.
Their consequences can be analysed step by step in a debugging like fashion. Having such
tool at hand can yield insight into the possible effects of selected faults on the nominal
behaviour of a system.
7.4 Fault Diagnosis
Often it is the case that systems misbehave while they are in operation. Especially in
critical situations, such as an aircraft accident, it is useful to have information about the
system behaviour just before something went wrong, as well during erroneous behaviour
until failure. If the logged data contains events of system components, fault diagnosis
becomes possible. Using a partitioned system model along with some fault assumptions,
the diagnosis process may be automated to a large extent. Assuming that a logged trace
of events is given, the model could be simulated, such that it produces the same trace of
events. If the trace does not belong to the nominal behaviour, the simulation must be
driven across some fault transition in order to reproduce the trace. In this case, the fault
transition would indicate a possible source of the systems misbehaviour. If the logged trace
is not found within the faulty behaviour as well, the fault assumption may be extended.
Besides an algorithm that uses a system model to reproduce a given trace, it would be
interesting to have efficient logging schemes. This raises the question whether there exists
logging mechanisms which provide a better probability to find a possible fault source.
7.5 Fault Tolerance Analysis
The last application to be named was a particular motivation for this work. In order to
determine if a system will tolerate faults before putting it into operation, it is necessary
to have a suitable system model. First of all, this model must be capable of precisely de-
scribing the systems expected behaviour. Beyond this, the model must provide means for
specifying anticipated faults, and should be powerful enough to simulate the consequences
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of the occurrence of faults. With such model, the possibility of faults can be included into
the analysis of the overall system behaviour. The comparison between fault-free behaviour
and behaviour under faults reveals potential differences. If there are no differences, whose
precise nature was formulated by means of relations over process expressions, the system
will tolerate the assumed faults. This means that the environment can not perceive any
difference between the behaviour executed by a system under faults on one side, and under
fault freedom on the other side. By extending the behavioural description formalism, a
system model which is suitable for analysing fault tolerance properties resulted.
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Appendix A
Process Contexts
When reasoning about processes, it is often useful to consider different scenarios in which
the process of interest occurs. Process contexts are the utility to express such scenarios in
general. They are very similar to usual process expressions, except that terms of a context
expressions may also be placeholders for a normal process expressions. Placeholders,
sometimes also called holes, are required to be unique and may occur at most once within
a context expression. For this purpose, a placeholder is represented as an integer number
surrounded by angular brackets. The syntax of process contexts is given by the following
definition.
Definition A.1 (Process Context, syntax) The definition of the context syntax is
based on a given syntax of process expressions, such as basic pi-calculus expressions, typed
or timed expressions or joined versions. Thus, P stands for process expressions in general
and can be substituted by a concrete definition. However, in this definition, any recursive
use of P is to be replaced by C. This way, the recursion is extended to C, such that it
includes holes C◦ .
Process Context: C ::= P
∣∣∣ C◦
Hole: C◦ ::= ◦n n ∈ N
A valid context expression contains only one occurrence of ◦n for each n. The set of all
process context expressions is denoted C.
There is a transformation function C :
−→P 7→ P accompanying any process context ex-
pression. It takes a number of process expressions and produces one process expression,
resulting from replacing each ◦i by −→P i. Thus, |−→P | must equal the number of holes in the
context expression. A special case is the so called one-hole-context , where |−→P | = 1. In
this case, the representation of the hole may be abbreviated to ◦. For example, C = ◦1 | ◦2
is a two-hole context. Its transformation function C(P,Q) gives the process expression
P | Q.
Example A.0.1 To illustrates context expressions and the use of the transformation
function, consider a simple process expression a.P . In this expression, a is a free name,
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i.e. a ∈ fn(a.P ). Can this be influenced by a context where a.P is used?. For example,
use context C1 = ◦ | Q. Applying the transformation function C1(a.P ) yields a.P | Q,
where a is also free. Moreover, it can be stated that fn(a.P ) ⊆ fn(C1(a.P )). Now
consider another context C2 = new a (◦). Clearly, in C2(a.P ) = new a (a.P ) the name a
is not free. Thus, the set of free names of a process is not preserved by arbitrary contexts.
Note that in situations where a context transformation function is used without explicit
statement of the corresponding context expression, arbitrary contexts are considered. For
example, the statement C(P ) ≈ C(Q) would take into account any context C. 
Using process context expressions it may be checked whether or not a property of
some process is preserved within a certain context, or if a property of a context, say C is
preserved when substituting a term, say P , by P ′. The latter case is related to congruence
relations between processes, which are important for process substitutability. Here, one
could say that P and P ′ are congruent with respect to the context C. If this is the case
for any possible context, P and P ′ are said to be congruent. An equivalence relation
identifying only congruent processes is called a process congruence.
Appendix B
An Intermediate Representation
High-level formalisms provide more complex and specialised constructs for the modelling
of behaviour, structure and other aspects of a system. In this section it is outlined, how the
semantics of such formalisms may be defined by an encoding of the high-level formalism
into the base layer representation. As a common basis for the encoding of frequently used
concepts, there is an intermediate representation in the encoding scheme of figure 4.12.
Its purpose is to provide a more convenient starting point for the encoding of high-level
formalisms. In particular, the goal is a unified encoding of concepts related to control flow,
declarations, expressions and communication. This section uses a syntax as notational
basis and gives semantic encoding of each construct into the basic representation. The
overall syntax of the intermediate representation is defined as follows.
Definition B.1 (Intermediate Layer, syntax)
Body ::= Declarations Statement
Statement ::= Expression Control Communication,
where denotes syntactic choice and terminal symbols are set in Type letters.
In [112] it is explained, how Body is used in the definition of the behaviour of components
and how it is integrated into the overall modelling approach. When specifying semantic
encodings, the following notation is used
Definition B.2 (Intermediate Layer, semantics)
[[Body]]
def
= new [[Declarations]]Links . ([[Declarations]]Defs |
new done : TS .([[Statement]]〈done〉) ) .
This denotes that the semantics of the non-terminal Body is given by the expression
on the right hand side. The expression is evaluated by recursively expanding all nested
semantic encodings, denoted by [[]]. Since the resulting expression only consists of terms
of the basic representation, this process is also called abstract interpretation based in
operational semantics. The semantic function is said to [[]] map the syntactical domain into
the semantic domain. The latter may be regarded as an abstract mathematical machine
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which executes the description subject to the semantic encoding. Detailed information
about abstract interpretation in compiler design can be found in [77].
If a syntactic rule contains multiple occurrences of one non-terminal, a semantic encod-
ing may require the explicit addressing of one of them. In these cases, multiple occurrences
may be augmented with indices or tics. For the correct typing of statement encodings, the
introduction of a convention is necessary. It is assumed that there is a function T : S 7→ B,
which gives the correct link type for any Statement argument. Therefore, the expression
new x : TS .([[S]]〈x〉) is always correctly typed. There is no loss in generality due to this
convention since the type of a Statement is known at the time of its semantic encoding.
Control Flow
In order to allow for the capturing of any 3rd generation programming language’s seman-
tics, the underlying encoding scheme must be based on a minimal set of generic semantic
primitives. Consequently, the intermediate layer provides basic control flow primitives
underlying any programming language - i.e. sequencing, alternative, loop, return and
fork.
Definition B.3 (Control Flow, syntax)
Control ::= S;S if E then S[ else S] end while E do S end ret E fork S,
Note that S and E are used as shorthand for non-terminals Statement and Expression,
respectively.
The semantics of control flow statements are formally defined by the following encoding
into the basic representation.
Definition B.4 (Control Flow, semantics)
[[S]]
def
= (done).done(B.1)
[[S1;S2]]
def
= (done : ?ˆ).new r1 : TS1 , r2 : TS2 .(B.2) (
[[S1]]〈r1〉 | r1 (res) .[[S2]]〈r2〉 | r2 (res) .done
)
[[ if E then S end ]]
def
= [[ if E then S else S end ]](B.3)
[[ if E then St else Sf end ]]
def
= (done : ?ˆ).new cond : ˆBoolean .(B.4) (
[[E]]〈cond〉 |
cond (res) .[res] ?
new r : TSt .
(
[[St]]〈r〉 | r (res) .done
)
:
new r : TSf .
(
[[Sf ]]〈r〉 | r (res) .done
))
[[ while E do S end ]]
def
= (done : ?ˆ). ((B.5)
[[ if E then [[S; while E do S end ]] end ]]
〈done〉 )
[[ ret E]]
def
= (done : ?ˆ). ([[E]]〈ret〉)(B.6)
[[ fork Body]]
def
= (done : ?ˆ).
(
[[Body]]
) | done(B.7)
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In the above encoding scheme, equations (B.2) and (B.3,B.4) specify sequencing and alter-
native respectively, equation (B.5) encodes a loop over statement S. The ret statement
in equation (B.6) uses a dedicated name ret as link name to send the value of the specified
expression. Thus, the expression of a return statement must comply with the type of the
ret link in the current scope. Definition (B.7) describes the forking and subsequent paral-
lel execution of Body (e.g. thread creation). Equation (B.1) denotes the empty statement,
which does nothing but signalling its termination via done. All encodings are based on
the convention that a single control flow statement always terminates by sending at done
as defined by the sequential process composition operator of Milner [65]. For control flow
statements the type of done is always ?ˆ, because it represents synchronisation without
data transfer. Expression statements also terminate by finally sending at a special link.
In contrast to control flow statements, this link must have a type that is compatible with
the values the expression generates, because the result of an expression is exchanged via
the termination link. An exception is the return statement, which does not signal its ter-
mination via done. Hence, all statements after a return statement will not be executed,
as desired.
Declarations
A declaration associates a definition with an identifier, such that the definition can be
referred to by name from other locations in the program source code. From the view point
of programming languages, a definition describes the type and structure of an identifier.
In the basic representation, this definition is represented by a process expression which
models the semantics of the defining statements of the programming language. The dec-
laration, i.e. the association of the definition with the identifier, is then represented by
locating the process expression of the definition at a given link. By convention, the name
of this link is equal to the identifier.
Programming languages use two kinds of declarations: declarations of data objects
and declarations of functions. These are general declaration primitives and are provided
by the intermediate level of the formalism hierarchy. The following definitions give their
encoding in the base layer.
Definition B.5 (Declarations, syntax) The non-terminal Declarations represents a
list of Declaration non-terminals, which in turn are either variable, function or constant
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declarations. A function declaration has a list of formal parameters, where each member
consists of a name id, followed by a type T .
Declarations ::= Declaration Declaration Declarations
Declaration ::= V arDecl FuncDecl ConstDecl
V arDecl ::= var id : T
FuncDecl ::= funct id ( FormalParams ) : T { Body }
ConstDecl ::= const id : T = value
FormalParams ::= FormalParam FormalParam , FormalParams
FormalParam ::= id : T
The following definition formalises the general encoding scheme for declarations, which
always consists of two parts, one for the encoding of the access links and another for the
encoding of the definitions associated with the declaration. definition.
Definition B.6 (Declarations, semantics) The encoding of Declarations is split into
two parts. One part is a comma separated list of name/type pairs and is given by the
Links-encoding of Declarations. This list is used argument to the pi-calculus new opera-
tor in the encoding of Body (cf. Definition B.2). The other part is a parallel composition
of process expressions, given by the Defs-encodings of the declarations.
[[Declarations]] ::= new [[Declarations]]Links . ([[Declarations]]Definitions)
[[Declarations]]Links ::= [[Declaration]]Link [[Declaration]]Link , [[Declarations]]Links
[[Declaration]]Link ::= [[V arDecl]]Link [[FuncDecl]]Link [[ConstDecl]]Link
[[Declarations]]Definitions ::= [[Declaration]]Def [[Declaration]]Def | [[Declarations]]Defs
[[Declaration]]Definition ::= [[V arDecl]]Def [[FuncDecl]]Def [[ConstDecl]]Def
Next, the declaration of a variable is defined in terms of the base representation.
Basically, a variable declaration consists of an identifier by which the variable is referred
to and the model of the variable itself. The model of the variable is a typed storage cell,
holding exactly one value of its type [65]. It is accessible via a link, whose name is given
by the identifier of the variable declaration. The storage cell can be read and written and
has an undefined initial value. It is modelled by a replicated process such that the values
persists after accessing the cell. Accessing the storage cell involves a protocol. First, the
accessing process sends a private access link via the variable’s identifier. Then it may
either send or receive on the private link, indicating writing or reading, respectively. In
case of writing, the storage cell receives the new value, which it will return in subsequent
read accesses. Otherwise the cell sends it’s current value.
Definition B.7 (V arDecl, semantics) V arDecl represents the declaration of a vari-
able. The declaration consists of an identifier id, a data type T . Since declarations are
encoded in two parts, there is a Link-encoding and a Def -encoding:
[[ var id : T ]]Link
def
= id : ˆˆT
[[ var id : T ]]Def
def
= V arCellid,T
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The definition V arCellid,T models a variable storage cell of given type T , which is acces-
sible via id:
V arCellid,T
def
= new callDCell : Tˆ, callUCell : ˆ? .
(
callUCell
| !callUCell.UndefinedCellid,T
| !callDCell (value) .DefinedCellid,T 〈value〉
)
UndefinedCellid,T
def
= id (access) .
(
access (value) .callDCell 〈value〉
+ access 〈Undefd〉.callUCell
))
DefinedCellid,T
def
= (value : T ).id (access) .
(
access (value) .callDCell 〈value〉
+ access 〈value〉.callDCell 〈value〉
))
.
where Undefd is a special value, denoting any value of any type. Thus, reading from an
uninitialised variable gives an undefined value.
The encoding of a function declaration follows a pattern similar to the variable declaration.
The function is also accessible within the scope of its definition via an identifier and a
simple access protocol. This time, the calling process first sends links to the actual
parameters and a private return link. Then, the return value is transmitted via the
return link, which synchronises termination of the function and continuation of the calling
process. I.e. the access protocol models the function call of imperative languages. Instead
of having a storage cell as definition, the function is defined by its body. Provided links to
the parameters are visible within the function body and may therefore be used to produce
the return value.
Definition B.8 (FuncDecl, semantics) FuncDecl represents the declaration of a func-
tion. The declaration consists of an identifier id, a formal parameter list FormalParams,
a return type TR and the function body Body. The function declaration is again in two
parts:
[[ funct id ( FormalParams ) : TR { Body } ]]Link
def
= id : [ˆ[FormalParams]]Types , TˆR
[[ funct id ( FormalParams ) : TR { Body } ]]Def
def
= ! id ([[FormalParams]]Names , ret) .[[Body]]
The Def encoding models a function by receiving the parameters via the access link before
continuing with the encoding of the function body. The whole process happens replicated,
such that the function can be called repeatedly. The Names-encoding of FormalParams
gives the list of parameter names. Their types, as well as the type of the return link ret
are determined by the type of the function access link id, as defined by the Link-encoding
of FuncDecl above.
[[FormalParams]]Types
def
= [[id : T ]]Type [[id : T ]]Type , [[FormalParams]]Types
[[id : T ]]Type
def
= T
[[FormalParams]]Names
def
= [[id : T ]]Name [[id : T ]]Name , [[FormalParams]]Names
[[id : T ]]Name
def
= id
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Finally, there are declarations of constants. In theory, constants are functions with zero
parameters1. Consequently, a constant declaration is a special function declaration, where
the body of the function simply returns the desired value.
Definition B.9 (ConstDecl, semantics) ConstDecl represents the declaration of a con-
stant. The declaration consists of an identifier id, a type T and a value of that type
value : T :
[[ const id : T = value]]
def
= [[ funct id () : T { ret value } ]]
Thus, the definition of the constant is a function with no parameters, returning the given
value.
Expressions
Expressions are evaluations of function declarations with actual parameters. Since the
list of actual parameters consists of expressions itself, it may contain further function
evaluations, such that complex expressions can be formed. The evaluation of a function
requires the previous evaluation of all parameter expressions. Using the encoding scheme
given in definition B.11 ensures the order of evaluations at dependency level. That is,
independent expressions may be evaluated in arbitrary order, and possibly concurrently.
If a high-level formalism restricts or implies a special ordering of independent expressions,
a special encoding must be given for their evaluation. Note that unary and binary operator
symbols are treated as unary and binary functions, respectively.
Definition B.10 (Expression, syntax) Expressions are defined as an identifier of a
variable, constant or function declaration, followed by an optional parameter list. The
parameter list is in turn a comma separated list of expressions.
Expression ::= identifier identifier ( ParamList ) baseval
ParamList ::= Expression Expression , ParamList
Definition B.11 (Expression, semantics)
[[baseval]]
def
= (return : Tbaseval ).return 〈baseval〉(B.8)
[[ identifier ]]
def
= (return : Tidentifier ).identifier 〈return〉(B.9)
[[ identifier ( ParamList ) ]]
def
= (return : Tidentifier ).new [[ParamList]]0Links.
(
(B.10)
[[ParamList]]0 |
identifier 〈[[ParamList]]0Names , return〉
)
[[Expression]]i
def
= [[Expression]]〈pi〉(B.11)
[[Expression, ParamList]]i
def
= [[Expression]]〈pi〉 | [[ParamList]]i+1(B.12)
[[Expression]]iLinks
def
= pi : TExpression(B.13)
1Functions in the mathematical sense, i.e. the result is completely determined by the actual parame-
ters.
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[[Expression, ParamList]]iLinks
def
= pi : TExpression , [[ParamList]]
i+1
Links(B.14)
[[Expression]]iNames
def
= pi(B.15)
[[Expression, ParamList]]iNames
def
= pi, [[ParamList]]
i+1
Names(B.16)
Communication Primitives
Many high-level formalisms provide means for specifying the sending or receiving of mes-
sages. These constructs come in different flavours, such as synchronous or asynchronous,
reliable or unreliable, or implying some kind of protocol.
Definition B.12 (Communication, syntax)
Communictation ::= Recv Send AsyncSend
Recv ::= Recv ( link , id )
Send ::= Send ( link , Expression )
AsyncSend ::= AsyncSend ( link , Expression )
Definition B.13 (Recv, semantics) The Recv communication primitive implements a
blocking reception of data along a link. The definition consists of an identifier link, an
identifier id , and is encoded as:
[[ Recv ( link , id ) ]]
def
= (return : ?ˆ).new l : Tˆid .link(data).id 〈l〉.l 〈data〉.return
The data received along link is stored in the variable located at id. The flow of control is
blocked until some other process is ready to send via link.
Definition B.14 (Send, semantics) The Send communication primitive implements
the blocking send of data along a link. The definition consists of an identifier link, an
expression Expression , and is encoded as:
[[ Send ( link , Expression ) ]]
def
=
(return : ?ˆ).new l : TˆExpression .(
[[Expression]]〈l〉 | l(data).link 〈data〉.return)
The expression is evaluated and the resulting value is sent via link. The flow of control
is blocked as long as no process is ready to receive at link.
Another useful communication primitive provided by various specification formalisms
is the asynchronous sending of messages. This is captured by AsyncSend with the fol-
lowing encoding.
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Definition B.15 (AsyncSend, semantics) The AsyncSend communication primitive
implements non-blocking sending of data along a link. The definition consists of an iden-
tifier link, an expression Expression, and is encoded as:
[[ AsyncSend ( link , Expression ) ]]
def
=
(return : ?ˆ).[[ fork Send(link, Expression)]]〈return〉
The expression is evaluated and the resulting value is sent via link. This statement con-
tinues immediately. The data being sent may never be received by any process.
Based on these encodings of basic control flow and data flow primitives, it is possible
to define a simple sequential or parallel programming language. Thereby, semantics are
automatically given, through the encodings, in terms of the basic behavioural representa-
tion.
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interaction points, 23, 43
KPN, 20
Kripke Structure, 88
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error, 28
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Theses
1. The importance of the integration of heterogeneous, distributed and networked sys-
tems is steadily growing. Thereby, a trend to layered system architectures using
some form of middleware can be observed.
2. The constituent parts of such complex systems are likely to be developed with a mix
of different description formalisms and models.
3. Uniform approaches to analysing such a composed system require its overall descrip-
tion in a common system model.
4. The proposed component-based system model, using a process algebra as a basis for
behavioural description, provides the foundation for uniform system descriptions.
5. Considering the complex handling of an algebraic description formalism, it is inap-
propriate to use it directly in the development process.
6. It is possible, to translate existing formalisms, such as programming languages,
into the uniform description formalism. This enables the handling of heterogeneous
system descriptions.
7. The proposed system model can describe layered systems.
8. The proposed system model supports the modelling of platforms and applications
as well as their integration.
9. The proposed system model does not distinguish between hardware and software
components, which is not necessary at this level of abstraction when the focus rests
on capturing the overall system behaviour.
10. The proposed system description formalism is closed under composition.
11. Before deploying systems in critical scenarios, it is desirable and sometimes required
to analyse their behaviour in the presence of faults.
12. Analysing the behaviour of a real system (i.e. one that is already implemented) is
expensive or even impossible.
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13. It is desirable to have a system model, which can predict the system behaviour under
faults.
14. Fault calculus provides a suitable formalism to express fault assumptions for a given
system model.
15. Fault calculus can be used to exploit the resulting behaviour under faults.
16. Fault calculus is strictly behavioural enlarging.
17. The presented process transformations (fault functions) formalise the notions of
system level faults commonly found in literature.
18. The partial fault models allow for a fine-grained specification of fault assumptions.
19. Corruption faults (where only the value, but not the transmission itself is affected)
are modelled by the value fault functions.
20. Fault calculus provides the framework to define a fault tolerance predicate (S−F −
tolerant) for system descriptions.
21. The proposed definition enables the mechanical evaluation of the fault tolerance
predicate for a given system description and a fault assumption, without the need
of manual modification of the system description.
